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Foreword
Techniques designed to evaluate the evidence of efficacy, effectiveness, and safety
in medicine abound. They are almost invariably based on the results of experi-
mental studies (primarily randomised controlled trials) or observational studies
(such as case-control designs). None, so far as I am aware, include evidence of
mechanisms.
This is perhaps surprising given the views of Sir Austin Bradford Hill. In his
famous Presidential Address to the Section of Occupational Health of the Royal
Society of Medicine in 1965, he outlined nine factors that should be ‘taken into
account’ when deciding whether an ‘association’ was ‘causal’. One of these factors
was what he called ‘biological plausibility.’ Yet, despite the growth of the
evidence-based medicine movement—many of whose principles have their genesis
in Bradford Hill’s famous lecture—none (in so far as I am aware) have included
evidence of mechanisms as part of their approach.
This work is therefore not just a timely reminder of the importance of mecha-
nisms. It is also a wake-up call to the evidence-based medicine movement to
incorporate mechanisms in their evaluation of ‘evidence.’ EBM+ comes of age.
London, UK
April 2018
Professor Sir Michael D. Rawlins
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Preface
The themes explored in this book began with a paper written by two of the authors
(Russo and Williamson 2007), which set out the core idea of evidential pluralism in
the context of establishing causation in medicine. An exploratory grant from the
UK Arts and Humanities Research Council for the project Mechanisms and the
evidence hierarchy allowed Brendan Clarke, Donald Gillies, Phyllis Illari, Federica
Russo, and Jon Williamson to develop a collaboration via a series of informal
workshops. This collaboration led to the publication of two papers which developed
these themes of evidence and mechanisms (Clarke et al. 2013, 2014).
This book was written during the course of two further three-year research
projects on evidence of mechanisms, connected to the EBM+ consortium. EBM+
aims to be a hub for research that contributes to our understanding of the role of
evidence of mechanisms in medical methodology. The research projects in question
were the Leverhulme-funded project Grading evidence of mechanisms in physics
and biology, which involved Stefan Dragulinescu, Veli-Pekka Parkkinen, and Jon
Williamson, and the AHRC-funded project Evaluating Evidence in Medicine. This
latter project involved Brendan Clarke, Athena Drakou, Donald Gillies, Phyllis
Illari, Mike Kelly, Charles Norell, Federica Russo, Beth Shaw, Kurt Straif, Jan
Vandenbrouke, Christian Wallmann, Michael Wilde, and Jon Williamson.
More widely, this work benefited from numerous interactions between scientists,
evidence appraisal practitioners and philosophers. These collaborations were sus-
tained by a constant effort, on all sides, to translate jargon and to explain
domain-specific problems and priorities. Inter- and transdisciplinary translation is a
difficult exercise, and we greatly appreciate the dedication, open-mindedness, and
patience of those with whom we have interacted. Our long-term project is to
contribute to the preparation of guidance in various areas of medical practice, by
providing conceptual tools that can add to current evaluation instruments. This
requires, more generally, addressing philosophical problems and challenges as they
arise in the practice of medicine. We would be keen to hear from others with similar
interests.
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The aim of this book. The aim of this book is twofold. On the one hand, we
develop an approach to evidence evaluation that complements the existing methods
used in EBM (and evidence-based policy more generally) by explicating the role of
evidence of mechanisms when assessing causal claims in medicine. On the other
hand, we aim to contribute to existing philosophical debates about evidence in
medicine by giving a detailed account of how evidence of mechanisms can be
evaluated.
Who should read this book. This book is intended for those who are interested
in evidence in the health sciences. This includes those who work directly with
evidence, such as guideline developers and those charged with evidence appraisal.
We are also writing for those whose interest in evidence is more conceptual. This
includes philosophers of science and medicine, as well as those who produce or
interpret guidance on the effectiveness of health interventions. This latter group
might include policy-makers, journalists, and politicians.
How to use this book. This book was written for those interested in philo-
sophical and practical questions that arise during the use of evidence in medicine,
public health, and social care. This is an extremely broad potential audience, and
the parts of this book approach these concepts in several different ways. Most of the
applied material is concentrated in Parts II and IV. Part II includes a variety of tools
for working with evidence of mechanisms suitable for different contexts, while
Part IV presents some specific applications of the ideas presented in the book. More
theoretical material can be found in Part I and Part III.
We have identified several likely paths that readers with different interests might
most fruitfully engage with the issues raised in this book.
For clinical practitioners, we would recommend that you begin by looking at
Part I in order to gain background information about mechanisms and evidence of
mechanisms. We would then suggest moving on to Part II. The tools presented in
Part II provide a way of applying the strategies developed in this book directly to
commonly encountered procedures in evidence appraisal, and they have been
developed so that they can be used independently of the more theoretical parts
of the book. They will provide a foundation for reading the more theoretical parts
of the book.
For policy-makers, guideline developers, and others involved in interpreting
evidence in the policy context, we would recommend reading Part I, before moving
on to the tools from Part II. Beginning in this way should leave the reader confident
to navigate the rest of the material here. We have also provided a series of particular
applications (in Part IV) which contain material of possible interest.
x Preface
For philosophers of medicine, we would suggest progressing from Part I to the
more theoretical parts of the book (i.e. Part III), and then returning to the more
applied material in the other chapters.
Appendices and a glossary are available at ebmplus.org/appendices.
Bergen, Norway Veli-Pekka Parkkinen
Canterbury, UK Christian Wallmann
Canterbury, UK Michael Wilde
London, UK Brendan Clarke
London, UK Phyllis Illari
Cambridge, UK Michael P. Kelly
London, UK Charles Norell
Amsterdam, The Netherlands Federica Russo
Portland, USA Beth Shaw
Canterbury, UK Jon Williamson
April 2018
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Abstract
The use of evidence in medicine is something we should continuously seek to
improve. This book seeks to develop our understanding of evidence of mechanism
in evaluating evidence in medicine, public health, and social care; and also offers
tools to help implement improved assessment of evidence of mechanism in practice.
In this way, the book offers a bridge between more theoretical and conceptual
insights and worries about evidence of mechanism and practical means to fit the
results into evidence assessment procedures.
The book is designed so that the reader can use different parts, according to their
primary aims.
Part I offers brief introductions to theoretical ideas developed in more depth in
later chapters. It functions to orient the reader quickly with respect to the key issues:
what evidence of mechanism is, the benefits of making its use more explicit, and the
outline of the EBM+ approach to evidence of mechanism in evidence assessment.
Part II offers tools that can be used to improve the assessment of evidence of
mechanism alongside evidence of correlation. Tools can be used in isolation or in
the combinations suggested. The starting place is an overview tool, ‘Is your policy
really evidence-based?’ Then further tools are provided for guideline developers for
medical practice; a critical appraisal tool for politicians, journalists, academics, and
so on; and a tool designed specifically for public health and social care.
Part III develops more theoretical ideas. It begins with the question of gathering
evidence of mechanisms, addressing the issue that the relevant studies are not all
indexed in the standard way of clinical trials (Chap. 5). Chapter 6 offers a process
for evaluating evidence of mechanisms, by first breaking down into specific
mechanism hypotheses, then combining the assessment into an evaluation of
the quality of evidence for a general mechanism hypothesis. The part finishes in
Chap. 7 by addressing how to integrate quality of evidence of the mechanism
hypothesis with evidence of correlation, to come to an overall assessment of the
quality of evidence for the causal claim.
Part IV examines some specific problems in applying evaluation of evidence of
mechanisms to particular domains.
xvii
The whole book can be used, or those with a more practical focus can use Parts I
and II, while those with a more theoretical interest can use Parts I and III, sup-






Abstract This chapter introduces the idea of EBM+, which adopts the explicit
requirements of EBM, to (1) make all the key evidence explicit and (2) adopt explicit
methods for evaluating that evidence. EBM+ then sets out to get us better causal
knowledge by explicitly integrating evidence of mechanism alongside evidence of
correlation. This chapter summarises some important benefits of including evidence
of mechanism, particularly given how highly idealised study populations typically
are, and introduces the need to make uses of evidence of mechanism more explicit.
This book describes a number of methods that integrate the appraisal of evidence
of mechanisms with other forms of evidence. While these methods are relevant to
many fields where evidence is assessed (see Clarke and Russo 2016), our starting
point is evidence-based medicine (EBM). The methods in this book build upon the
tools already developed by EBM, by taking evidence of mechanisms into account in
addition to the clinical studies that are the focus of EBM.We refer to this development
as EBM+.
EBM+ Evidence of mechanisms should be integrated with evidence of cor-
relation to better assess causal claims.
Medical practice depends fundamentally on the assessment of causal claims:
Examples of assessing causal claims in medicine.
• Identifying the causes of cancers in humans.
• Evaluating whether a medical device will lead to improved outcomes in a
particular patient.
• Establishing whether a public health action will have the desired effects in
the target population.
• Determining whether a medicine has a specific detrimental side-effect.
• Ascertaining the cost effectiveness of a health intervention on a target popu-
lation.
© The Author(s) 2018
V.-P. Parkkinen et al., Evaluating Evidence of Mechanisms in Medicine,
SpringerBriefs in Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94610-8_1
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4 1 Introduction
Causal claims underpin evidence-based medicine, guideline development, per-
sonalised medicine, narrative medicine, and other aspects of medicine.
This book concentrates on EBM because we explicitly endorse two core EBM
principles:
Two principles of EBM endorsed in this book.
1. Make all the key evidence explicit.
2. Adopt explicit methods for evaluating that evidence.
These principles have been largely responsible for the significant advances made
by EBM. In particular, EBM prompted the widespread adoption of techniques for
analysing data on medical interventions, with the objective of determining whether
these interventions are in fact delivering the expected results.
In this book, these principles are developed with respect to evidence of mecha-
nisms. First, evidence of mechanisms is often key evidence and needs to be made
explicit. Second, evidence of mechanisms needs to be explicitly evaluated when
assessing a causal claim.
1.1 What is the Key Evidence?
EBM has hitherto focused primarily on one kind of evidence for a causal claim:
evidence arising from clinical studies, including randomised trials and observational
studies. However, this book is motivated by the idea that evidence for causal claims
in medicine cannot simply be reduced to evidence of correlation. In the philosophy
of causality, the following thesis has been put forward (Russo andWilliamson 2007):
Evidential pluralism. This is the thesis that one typically needs both evidence
of correlation and evidence of mechanisms to establish a causal claim.
Evidential pluralism is relevant to deciding what counts as key evidence. As we
shall explain, the supposition that the key evidence will be all of one type (e.g.,
evidence from RCTs) is not a good one. Note that this thesis about forms of evidence
goes beyond the (intuitively appealing) idea that taking more evidence into account
will lead to better inferences.
To develop this argument, two pieces of terminology will be helpful: efficacy and
effectiveness. (Technical terms are hyperlinked to their definitions. A full glossary is
available in the online appendices.) Although these are likely to be familiar to most
readers because of their widespread use in the medical literature, our usage of these
terms is broader than their usual meaning. We define these terms as follows:
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Efficacy concerns the effect(s) of some intervention or exposure in a particular
study population. An efficacy claim is a claim that the intervention or exposure
has some specific effect in the study population.
Effectiveness concerns the effect(s) of an intervention or exposure in some
target population of interest, such as a population of patients to be treated. An
effectiveness claim is a claim that the intervention or exposure has some specific
effect in the target population.
The term ‘efficacy’ is normally only used in the context of a beneficial effect of
an intervention. However, what we have to say in this book applies equally when
assessing whether an intervention causes some particular harm, or when assessing
whether an exposure causes a particular harm (or, indeed, benefit). So we use ‘effi-
cacy’ throughout this book in amore general sense, covering harms aswell as benefits
and exposures as well as interventions. Similarly for ‘effectiveness’.
When a relationship applies more broadly than in a study population, it is some-
times said to be externally valid:
External validity concerns an inference from a study to a target population. If
a causal claim that holds in a study population can be extrapolated to a target
population of interest, then it may be described as externally valid.
To use the terminology of Cartwright and Hardie (2012, 15), external validity
concerns how we go from knowing that something works somewhere (efficacy) to
knowing that it will work for us (effectiveness). Extrapolation is typically crucial for
demonstrating effectiveness:
Effectiveness = efficacy + external validity. Typically, one establishes that a
causal claim holds in a target population by establishing the claim in a study
population and then extrapolating that claim to the target population.
The reason for proceeding to effectiveness via efficacy and external validity is
that a study population is typically highly idealised, and thus differs from the target
population in important ways. For example, a study population for evaluating the
effectiveness of a drug might exclude those with multiple morbidities or pregnant
women; a study population for evaluating the carcinogenicity of an environmental
exposure might be a laboratory population of an animal model. Establishing external
validity is crucial because the mechanism of action in the study population may not
be particularly robust.
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An idealised population is one which is a non-representative subpopulation of
the general population. Idealised populations satisfy certain ideal experimental
conditions or experience a narrowly circumscribed range of exposures.
A robust mechanism is one that works in the same way across a wide variety
of background conditions; a fragile mechanism does not.
As we shall see, evidence of mechanisms is crucial to establishing both effi-
cacy and external validity. While evidence of mechanisms is already implicit in, for
example, the design of clinical trials, mechanistic studies are generally not explicitly
evaluated whenmaking policy or treatment decisions (Clarke et al. 2013, 2014). This
is largely a consequence of the downplaying of mechanistic studies in the most influ-
ential EBM methods manuals (such as GRADE), owing to concerns about possible
bias. While we acknowledge that there are valid concerns about biases, we regard
this wholesale downplaying as a mistake. At present, evidence of mechanisms does
in fact influence the evaluation of effectiveness. For example, there may be evidence
that the mechanism of action in a study population is rather different from those
in a target population and this difference can be taken into account when assessing
the effectiveness of a drug. But this influence of evidence of mechanisms is often
invisible, because it is mediated by the opinions of experts, particularly expert panel
members on evidence appraisal committees. This influence is reasonable: evidence
of mechanisms plays a vital role in providing evidence of effectiveness. However,
the lesson of evidence-based medicine is that one needs to make evidence explicit
in order to scrutinise and challenge it properly, and that one needs to make explicit
the ways in which evidence is evaluated in order to improve these methods of eval-
uation. This book seeks to extend this evidence-based approach to include evidence
of mechanisms.
Evidence ofmechanisms is often produced bymeans other than clinical studies. In
philosophy of science, much attention has been devoted to the concept of mechanism
in biology and medicine, as well as in many other scientific domains (see Chap. 2
for an introduction to mechanisms). However, comparatively less attention has been
devoted to the question of how evidence of mechanisms is generated and assessed,
especially in the context of medical practice. This gives rise to the next major theme
of this book: how should we evaluate our evidence?
1.2 The Process of Evaluating Evidence
If—in common with many of those interested in EBM—your first exposure to the
methods of EBM came from the profusion of introductory articles published in the
medical literature in the late 1990s (such as Sackett et al. 1996), you might get
the impression that the quality of a piece of clinical research could be determined
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with relatively straightforward judgements of the methodology used in the research.
Was the research randomised? Did the authors use intention-to-treat analysis? Had
the statistical analysis produced a significant result? Unless these conditions were
jointly satisfied, the research was of very low quality. And if they were satisfied,
then it was likely that the work was of high quality, and should be used as a guide to
practice—unless very serious provisos were detected (such as research misconduct).
This is because the evaluation of evidence in early EBMwas about describing the
methods used to produce that evidence. This placed the onus of judging the quality of
a piece of research largely on the reader. In turn, this led to an emphasis on critiquing
research methods as a proxy for judging the quality of research (Greenhalgh 2014,
28). Concerns about bias were given priority, and this heightened scrutiny of research
methods has been the major defence against biased research.
However, critiquing research methods (rather than the details of a specified piece
of research) is only possible because—for all the many complications of doing clin-
ical research—many individual clinical studies share the same fundamental design.
This means that shared ways of evaluating quality can be fairly easily learned and
applied by health scientists, with the reasonable expectation that these simple meth-
ods are effective in stripping out biased research.
There is a fallacy here. Evaluating a small number of indicators did much of the
work in downgrading biased research, and it did it in an efficient and simple way. Yet
that is not to say that these techniquesworkedwithout any judgement on the part of the
evaluator. Nor did these techniques work flawlessly. Although some research designs
are more prone to bias than others, it does not automatically follow that, for instance,
all non-randomised research is intrinsically biased. To use the terminology devised
by Kahneman (2011), this kind of evaluation is a kind of system 1 thinking: fast and
easy, but prone to faults.We are rightly suspicious of other kinds of system 1 thinking
because of its propensity to bias. But sometimes speed is preferable to accuracy, and
system 1 thinking may often be good enough. And we might choose to evaluate,
for instance, clinical studies in this system 1 manner because there is a common
structure of clinical research that allows us to make good enough judgements about
their likely quality (Kahneman 2011). If EBM was a useful first approximation to
evidence evaluation, then EBM+ is intended as a second, improved, approximation.
The same assumptions about commonality of methods do not seem to apply to
evidence of mechanisms. It is hard to think of a field with more methodological
diversity than contemporary bioscience research. For example, computer simula-
tions, 31-P NMR, mass spectrometry, knockout studies and immunofluorescence do
not exhaust the space of research strategies that have been used to understand a sin-
gle protein (Mitchell and Dietrich 2006). And so we do not offer, in this book, a
tool capable of evaluating all of this research in a substance-blind manner. We note
in passing too that the presence of candidate indicators for clinical studies (such as
intention to treat analysis, randomisation, or trial registration) that have been touted
as ensuring that a piece of research can be accepted without question do no such
thing, although they are individually helpful to an expert judge of clinical evidence.
We need to judge evidence, and the methods and tools provided here are an aid to
judgement, rather than a replacement for it.
8 1 Introduction
1.3 Our Approach to Evaluating Evidence
The approach to evaluating evidence that is developed in this book can be traced back
to work of Russo and Williamson (2007), who put forward an account of eviden-
tial pluralism in medicine. Williamson (2018) offers a recent defence of evidential
pluralism.
Evidential pluralism in medicine is not a new idea. For instance, the causal indi-
cators put forward by Hill (1965) can be viewed as a version of evidential pluralism.
Several of Hill’s indicators of causality are good indicators of mechanisms, while
others are good indicators of correlation. We discuss Hill’s indicators, and explain
how our approach improves over them, in Chap. 6; see also Williamson (2018b).
The methods for evidence evaluation that we set out in later parts of the book
all require judgement on the part of the user (Kelly and Moore 2012; Montgomery
2005). We do not pretend that there is a shibboleth or an algorithm that determines
the excellence (or otherwise) of a piece of evidence of mechanisms. All evaluations
of quality of evidence are fallible. With this work, we hope to reach those readers
interested in combining practical methods for evidence evaluationwith philosophical
analysis.
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Chapter 2
An Introduction to Mechanisms
Abstract This chapter offers a brief summaryofmechanisms, as including complex-
system mechanisms (a complex arrangement of entities and activities, organised in
such a way as to be regularly or predictably responsible for the phenomenon to
be explained) and mechanistic processes (a spatio-temporal pathway along which
certain features are propagated from the starting point to the end point). The chapter
emphasises that EBM+ is concerned with evidence of mechanisms, not mere just-so
stories, and summarises some key roles assessing evidence of mechanisms can play,
particularly with respect to assessing efficacy and external validity.
This chapter introduces mechanisms and their use in the context of working with
evidence in medicine. The first section gives an extremely short introduction to
mechanisms that assumes no prior knowledge. Subsequent sections develop our
account of mechanisms in more detail.
2.1 Mechanisms at a Glance
Mechanisms allow us to understand complex systems (e.g., physiological or social
systems) and can help us to explain, predict, and intervene. An important subclass
of mechanisms is characterised by the following working definition:
A complex-systemsmechanism for a phenomenon consists of entities and activ-
ities organised in such a way that they are responsible for the phenomenon (Illari
and Williamson 2012, 120).
For the example mechanism of Fig. 2.1, the phenomena are the effects of a drug,
the drug and the receptor are the parts, and the interactions are the binding and
triggering.
© The Author(s) 2018
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Fig. 2.1 A simple example
of a mechanism diagram that
shows the effects produced













Why do mechanisms matter? Mechanisms explain how things work. This makes
them important in their own right, but also means that they are often used when
designing clinical studies. For example, one might decide to use a biomarker to
evaluate the effect of a drug, and that decision would rely on our knowledge of some
mechanism that links the biomarker with the drug. Note that while mechanisms of
drug action are an important kind of mechanism, they are not the only kinds of
mechanism that we will consider here.
Caveats:
• We will be interested in evidence of mechanisms, not descriptions of mech-
anisms for which there is no evidence. To be useful, descriptions of mech-
anisms should be connected to high-quality research, and not just to either
background knowledge or to what Pawson (2003) calls ‘programme theories’.
Otherwise they are merely just-so stories. Descriptions of mechanisms need
to be supported by evidence to be useful.
• Mechanistic studies are not normally sufficient on their own to justify treat-
ment or policy decisions. Other supporting evidence (such as that arising from
clinical studies) is normally required.
• As is the case with other kinds of evidence, evidence of mechanisms is not
infallible.
Why should one scrutinise evidence of mechanisms in healthcare? As explained
in Sect. 2.3 below, evidence of mechanisms can support or undermine judgements of
efficacy and external validity. Therefore, using evidence of mechanisms in concert
with other forms of evidence results in better healthcare decisions. (We use the anal-
ogy of reinforced concrete to explain this claim; see p. 92.) If this sort of mechanistic
reasoning is not properly scrutinised, medical decisions may be adversely affected.
For example, current tools for evaluating the quality of clinical research (such as
GRADE) do not scrutinise assumptions about mechanisms that have been used to
design clinical studies. Just as EBM improved clinical practice by scrutinising clin-
ical studies, scrutinising evidence of mechanisms can lead to further improvements.
We have provided some suitable tools for assisting such scrutiny in Chap. 4.
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Mechanisms are the + in EBM+
2.2 What is a Mechanism?
Mechanisms are invoked to explain (Machamer et al. 2000;Gillies 2017b). Textbooks
in the biomedical and social sciences are replete with diagrams and descriptions of
mechanisms. These are used to explain the proper function of features of the human
body, to explain diseases and their spread, to explain the functioning of medical
devices, and to explain social aspects of health interventions, among other things.
One kind ofmechanism, a complex-systemsmechanism, is a complex arrangement
of entities and activities, organised in such a way as to be regularly or predictably
responsible for the phenomenon to be explained (Illari andWilliamson 2012). In such
mechanisms, spatio-temporal and hierarchical organisation tend to play a crucial
explanatory role (Williamson 2018, Sect. 1).
Another kind of mechanism, a mechanistic process, consists in a spatio-temporal
pathway along which certain features are propagated from the starting point to the
end point (Salmon 1998). Examples include the motion of a billiard ball from cue
to collision, and the trajectory of a molecule in the bloodstream from injection to
metabolism.This sort ofmechanism is often one-off, rather than operating in a regular
and repeatable way. In the case of environmental causes of disease, the repercussions
of these processes may take a long time to develop—e.g., they may be mediated by
epigenetic changes.
In the health sciences, mechanistic explanations often involve a combination of
these two sorts of mechanism. For example, an explanation of a certain cancer may
appeal to the mechanistic processes that bring environmental factors into the human
body, the eventual failure of the body’s complex-systems mechanisms for preventing
damage, and the resulting mechanistic processes that lead to disease, including the
propagation of tumours (Russo and Williamson 2012).
We shall use ‘mechanism’ to refer to a complex-systems mechanism or a mecha-
nistic process or some combination of the two.We should emphasise thatmechanisms
in medicine and public health may be social as well as biological (see Chap. 9 and
Clarke and Russo 2017), and, in the case of medical devices, for instance, they may
also include technological components.
A clinical study is the usual method for establishing that two variables are corre-
lated:
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A clinical study for the claim that A is a cause of B repeatedly measures the
values of a set of measured variables that includes the variables A and B. These
values are recorded in a dataset. In an experimental study, the measurements
are made after an experimental intervention. If no intervention is performed,
the study is an observational study: a cohort study follows a group of people
over time; a case control study divides the study population into those who
have a disease and those who do not and surveys each cohort; a case series is
a study that tracks patients who received a similar treatment or exposure. An
n-of-1 study consists of repeated measurements of a single individual; other
studies measure several individuals. Clinical studies are crucial for estimating
any correlation between A and B, and they indirectly provide evidence relevant
to the claim that A is a cause of B (see Fig. 3.1).
On the other hand, a much wider variety of methods can provide good evi-
dence of mechanisms—including direct manipulation (e.g., in vitro experiments),
direct observation (e.g., biomedical imaging, autopsy), clinical studies (e.g., RCTs,
cohort studies, case control studies, case series), confirmed theory (e.g., established
immunological theory), analogy (e.g., animal experiments) and simulation (e.g.,
agent-based models) (Clarke et al. 2014; Williamson 2018). A mechanistic study
is a study which provides evidence of the details of a mechanism:
A mechanistic study for the claim that A is a cause of B is a study which
provides evidence of features of the mechanism by which A is hypothesised to
cause B.Mechanistic studies can be produced by means of in vitro experiments,
biomedical imaging, autopsy, established theory, animal experiments and simu-
lations, for instance. Moreover, consider a clinical study for the claim that A is a
cause of C, where C is an intermediate variable on the path from A to B—e.g., a
surrogate outcome. Such a study is also a mechanistic study because it provides
evidence of certain details of themechanism fromA toB. A clinical study for the
claim that A is a cause of B is not normally a mechanistic study for the claim that
A is a cause of B because, although it can provide indirect evidence that there
exists some mechanism linking A and B, it does not normally provide evidence
of the structure or features of that mechanism. Similarly, a mechanistic study
for the claim that A is a cause of B is not normally a clinical study for the claim
that A is a cause of B, because it does not repeatedly measure values of A and
B together. A study will be called a mixed study if it is both a clinical study
and a mechanistic study—i.e., if it both measures values of A and B together
and provides evidence of features of the mechanism linking A and B. To avoid
confusion, the terminology clinical study and mechanistic study will be used
to refer only to non-mixed studies.
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There are various reasons for taking evidence of mechanisms into account when
assessing claims inmedicine. In general, when evidence is limited, themore evidence
one can take into account, and the more varied this evidence is, the more reliable the
resulting assessments (Claveau 2013). Moreover, when deciding whether to approve
a new health intervention, or whether a chemical is carcinogenic, for example, it can
take a very long time to gather enough evidence if the only evidence one considers
is clinical study evidence. By considering evidence of mechanisms in conjunction
with clinical study evidence, decisions can be made earlier: one can reduce the time
taken for a drug to reach market (Gibbs 2000), and reduce the time taken to restrict
exposure to carcinogens, for instance.
There are also reasons for considering evidence of mechanisms that are particular
to the task at hand. While evidence of mechanisms can inform a variety of tasks
(see below), in this book we focus on its use for evaluating efficacy and external
validity. Williamson (2018) provides a detailed justification of the need for evidence
of mechanisms when performing these two tasks. Here we shall briefly sketch the
main considerations.
Evaluating efficacy. As noted above, establishing effectiveness can be broken down
into two steps: establishing efficacy and establishing external validity. Establishing
efficacy, i.e., thatA is a cause ofB in the study population, in turn requires establishing
two things. First,A andB need to be appropriately correlated. Second, this correlation
needs to be attributable to A causing B, rather than some other explanation, such as
bias, confounding or some connection other than a causal connection (Williamson
2018, Sect. 1).
If it is genuinely the case that A is a cause of B, then there is some combination
of mechanisms that explains instances of B by invoking instances of A and that can
account for the magnitude of the observed correlation. As a mechanism of action
may only be present in some individuals but not others, it needs to be credible that
the mechanism of action operates in enough individuals to explain the size of the
observed correlation in the study population. Just finding a mechanism of action in
some individuals is insufficient. Thus, in order to establish efficacy one needs to
establish both the existence of an appropriate correlation in the study population
and the existence of an appropriate mechanism that can explain that correlation.
We shall refer to this latter claim—that there is a mechanism that can explain that
correlation—as the general mechanistic claim for efficacy:
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General mechanistic claim. In the case of efficacy, the general mechanistic
claim takes the form: there exists a mechanism linking the putative cause A to
the putative effectB, which explains instances ofB in terms of instances ofA and
which can account for the observed correlation between A and B. In the case of
external validity, the general mechanistic claim is: the mechanism responsible
for B in the target populations is sufficiently similar to that responsible for B in
the study population.
More generally, evidence of mechanisms can help rule in or out various explana-
tions of a correlation. For example, it can help to determine the direction of causation,
which variables are potential confounders, whether a treatment regime is likely to
lead to performance bias, and whether measured variables are likely to exhibit tem-
poral trends.
Some alternative explanations of a correlation can be rendered less credible by
choosing a particular study design. Adjusting for known confounders and randomi-
sation can lower the probability of confounding. Blinding can reduce the probability
of performance and detection bias. Larger trials can reduce the probability of chance
correlations. Selecting variables A and B that do not exhibit significant temporal
trends and that are spatio-temporally disjoint can reduce the probability of some
other explanations.
In certain cases, clinical studies alone might establish that an observed correla-
tion is causal (Williamson 2018, Sect. 2.1). However, establishing a causal claim in
the absence of evidence of the details of the underlying mechanisms requires sev-
eral independent studies of sufficient size and quality of design and implementation
which consistently exhibit a sufficiently large correlation (aka ‘effect size’), so as to
rule out explanations of the correlation other than causation. This situation is rare:
evidence from clinical studies is typically more equivocal. Therefore, evidence of
mechanisms obtained from sources other than clinical studies can play a crucial role
in deciding efficacy. Considering this other evidence is likely to lead to more reliable
causal conclusions. Where this evidence needs to be considered, its quality should
be evaluated in ways such as those set out in this book.
Evaluating external validity. Having established efficacy, i.e., that a causal relation-
ship obtains in the study population, one needs to establish external validity—that
the causal relationship can be extrapolated to the target population of interest.
As noted above, establishing that A is a cause of B requires establishing both
that A and B are correlated and that there is some mechanism that can account for
this correlation. Having established these facts in the study population, one can infer
causation in the target population with some confidence if one can establish that:
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1. In the target population, there is a mechanism that is sufficiently similar to the
mechanism of action in the study population, and
2. Any mechanisms in the target population which counteract this mechanism do
not mask the effect of the mechanism of action to such an extent that a net
correlation in the target population could not be explained mechanistically.
Evaluating external validity, then, requires evaluating whether the complex of
relevant mechanisms in the target population is sufficiently similar to that in the
study population, in the sense of (1) and (2) holding. Evidence of mechanisms is
therefore crucial to this mode of inference.
This form of inference can be especially challenging when the study population
is an animal study and the target population is a human population (Wilde and
Parkkinen 2017). This is because, despite important similarities between several
physiological mechanisms in certain animals and those in humans, many differences
also exist. This form of inference can also be challenging when both the study and the
target population are human populations. This is because human behaviour is often a
component of an intervention mechanism and may in fact hinder the effectiveness of
the intervention.Wediscuss this inChap. 9. Somewell-known examples of behaviour
modifying effectiveness include the Tamil Nadu Integrated Nutrition Project (India)
and the North Karelia Project (Finland), both discussed by Clarke et al. (2014).
Otherquestions.Apart fromwhen evaluating efficacy and external validity, evidence
of mechanisms can also be helpful when:
• Drawing inferences about a single individual, for treatment and personalised
medicine (Wallmann and Williamson 2017);
• Commissioning new research and devising new research funding proposals;
• Justifying the use of clinical studies, designing them, and interpreting their results
(Clarke et al. 2014);
• Suggesting and analysing adverse drug effects—see Gillies (2017a), who argues
that consideration of evidence of mechanisms would have been necessary to avoid
the thalidomide disaster;
• Designing drugs and new devices;
• Building economic models in order to ascertain cost effectiveness of a health
intervention;
• Deciding how surrogate outcomes are related to outcomes of interest.
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Example. How evidence of mechanisms can help with the analysis of
adverse drug effects: abacavir hypersensitivity syndrome.
Abacavir is a nucleoside analog reverse transcriptase inhibitor, widely used
as part of combination antiretroviral therapy for HIV/AIDS, that received an
FDA licence in 1998. However, its use was initially complicated by a severe,
life-threatening, hypersensitivity reaction that occurred in approximately 5%
of users (precise estimates vary; Clay (2002) gives a range of 2.3–9%). There
was confusion regarding the cause of this reaction, and it was thought that ‘it
is not possible to characterize those patients most likely to develop the HSR’
on the basis of reports of the syndrome (Clay 2002, 2505).
This changed with the discovery that the hypersensitivity syndrome only
occurred in individuals with the HLA-B*5701 allele (Mallal et al. 2002).
This discovery arose from evidence of mechanisms. These authors noted that
there were similarities between the mechanisms of several hypersensitivity
syndromes—by ‘evidence that the pathogenesis of several similar multisys-
tem drug hypersensitivity reactions involves MHC-restricted presentation of
drug or drug metabolites, with direct binding of these non-peptide antigens
to MHC molecules or haptenation to endogenous proteins before T-cell pre-
sentation’ (Mallal et al. 2002, 727). Patients are now genetically screened
for the HLA-B*5701 allele, and this has greatly reduced the incidence of the
hypersensitivity syndrome (Rauch et al. 2006).
In this book, we focus largely on the use of evidence of mechanisms to help
establish efficacy and external validity. The problem of drawing inferences about a
single individual is briefly discussed in Chap. 10.
Importance of considering evidence of mechanisms. Recall that in certain cases
clinical studies on their own suffice to establish efficacy and there is no need for
a detailed evaluation of other evidence of mechanisms. In other cases, however,
evidence of mechanisms arising from sources other than clinical studies can be
decisive. In such cases, it is important to scrutinise and evaluate this evidence, just
as it is important to scrutinise and evaluate clinical studies.
Situations in which it is particularly important to critically assess evidence of
mechanisms arising from sources other than clinical studies include:
• Where clinical studies give conflicting results, are of limited quality, or otherwise
exhibit uncertainty about the effect size;
• Where randomised clinical studies are not possible, for practical or ethical reasons,
in the population of interest (e.g., evaluating putative environmental causes of
cancer in humans; evaluating the action of drugs in children and pregnant women);
• Where clinical studies are underpowered with respect to the outcomes of interest
(e.g., when assessing adverse reactions to drugs by means of studies designed to
test the efficacy of the drug);
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• Any question of external validity where clinical studies in the target population
are limited or inconclusive;
• Assessing the effectiveness of a public health action or a social care intervention,
where a thorough understanding of the relevant social mechanisms is important;
• Assessing the effectiveness of amedical device,where themechanismof the device
and its interaction with biological mechanisms may not be immediately obvious.
Some commentators have argued that one should disregard evidence of mech-
anisms, largely on the grounds that mechanistic reasoning has sometimes proved
dangerous in the past. An infamous example concerns advice on baby sleeping posi-
tion in order to prevent sudden infant death syndrome (Evans 2002, 13–14). On the
basis of seemingly plausible mechanistic considerations, it was recommended that
babies be put to sleep on their fronts, since putting a baby to sleep on its back seemed
to increase the likelihood of sudden infant death caused by choking on vomit. How-
ever, comparative clinical studies later made clear that this advice had led to tens of
thousands of avoidable cot deaths (Gilbert et al. 2005). There are several other exam-
ples of harmful or ineffective interventions recommended on the basis of mechanistic
reasoning (Howick 2011, 154–157). As a result, it has been argued that relying on
evidence of mechanisms can do more harm than good.
In many of these cases, however, the proposed evidence of mechanisms was not
explicitly evaluated: often, there was little more than a psychologically compelling
story about a mechanism (Clarke et al. 2014, 350). In such cases, making the evi-
dence explicit and explicitly evaluating that evidence would have been enormously
beneficial. Thus there is a difference betweenmechanistic reasoning, which in some
cases is based on rather little evidence and can be problematic, and evaluatingmech-
anistic evidence, which is almost always helpful. The case of anti-arrhythmic drugs
may help to illustrate this distinction. Arguably, anti-arrhythmic drugs were recom-
mended on the basis of ill-founded mechanistic reasoning (Howick 2011). The story
goes as follows. After a heart attack, patients are at a higher risk of sudden death.
Those patients are also more likely to experience arrhythmia. On the basis of some
mechanistic reasoning, it was thought likely that there was a mechanism linking
arrhythmia to heart attacks. Anti-arrhythmic drugs were, as a result, prescribed in an
attempt to indirectly prevent heart attacks by directly preventing arrhythmia. It was
later discovered on the basis of the Cardiac Arrhythmia Suppression Trial (CAST)
that, unfortunately, the drugs led to an increase in mortality (Echt et al. 1991). See
also Furberg (1983). However, at least in retrospect, it looks as though insufficient
attention had been paid to mechanistic evidence. In particular, there was little reason
to think that reducing arrhythmia was a good surrogate outcome for reducing mortal-
ity due to heart attacks. Indeed Holman (2017) argues that pharmaceutical company
influence was largely responsible for that choice of surrogate outcome. In this case,
properly considering the mechanistic evidence may have led to not recommending
anti-arrhythmic drugs.
A critic of the use of evidence of mechanisms might respond that even when
there exists good evidence of mechanisms, many biomedical processes are so com-
plex that it is remains difficult to establish causal claims on the basis of evidence
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of mechanisms (Howick 2011, 136–143). For example, there was arguably some
good mechanistic evidence in favour of the claim that dalcetrapib lowers the risk
of developing coronary heart disease by increasing the ratio of HDL:LDL. How-
ever, a randomised controlled trial showed that risk of coronary heart disease was
not significantly affected (Schwartz et al. 2012). A possible explanation for this
failure was identified by Tardif et al. (2015), who identified two genetic subgroups
of patients. While one subgroup appeared to benefit from dalcetrapib, the second
genetic subgroup was harmed. Here, while further work was required to understand
the mechanisms in play at the stage of the dalcetrapib clinical trial, it appears as if a
credible conclusion has now been reached.
More generally, it is widely accepted that the complexity of biomedical processes
presents a significant hurdle for establishing causal claims solely on the basis of
evidence of mechanisms. But this is exactly why this book recommends explicitly
evaluating evidence of mechanisms alongside evidence of correlation. Evidence of
mechanisms is not sufficient for good clinical decision making—but neither is evi-
dence of mere correlation.
References
Clarke, B., & Russo, F. (2017). Mechanisms and biomedicine. In S. Glennan & P. Illari (Eds.),
The Routledge handbook of mechanisms and mechanical philosophy, Chap. 24 (pp. 319–331).
London: Routledge.
Clarke, B., Gillies, D., Illari, P., Russo, F., & Williamson, J. (2014). Mechanisms and the evidence
hierarchy. Topoi, 33(2), 339–360.
Claveau, F. (2013). The independence condition in the variety-of-evidence thesis. Philosophy of
Science, 80(1), 94–118.
Clay, P. (2002). The abacavir hypersensitivity reaction: A review. Clinical Therapeutics, 24(10),
1502–14.
Echt, D. S., Liebson, P. R., Mitchell, L. B., Peters, R. W., Obias-Manno, D., & Barker, A. H.,
et al. (1991). Mortality and morbidity in patients receiving encainide, flecainide, or placebo. New
England Journal of Medicine, 324(12), 781–788.
Evans, D. (2002). Database searches for qualitative research. Journal of the Medical Library Asso-
ciation, 90, 290–3.
Furberg, C. (1983). Effect of antiarrhythmic drugs on mortality after myocardial infarction. The
American Journal of Cardiology, 52, C32–C36.
Gibbs, J. B. (2000). Mechanism-based target identification and drug discovery in cancer research.
Science, 287(5460), 1969–1973.
Gilbert, R., Salanti, G., Harden, M., & See, S. (2005). Infant sleeping position and the sudden infant
death syndrome: systematic review of observational studies and historical review of recommen-
dations from 1940 to 2002. International Journal of Epidemiology, 34(4), 874–887.
Gillies, D. (2017a). Evidence of mechanism in the evaluation of streptomycin and thalidomide.
Studies in the History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 66, 55–62.
Gillies, D. (2017b). Mechanisms in medicine. Axiomathes, 27(6), 621–634.
Holman, B. (2017). Philosophers on drugs. Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1642-2.
Howick, J. (2011). The philosophy of evidence-based medicine. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
Illari, P. M., & Williamson, J. (2012). What is a mechanism? Thinking about mechanisms across
the sciences. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 2, 119–135.
References 21
Machamer, P., Darden, L., &Craver, C. (2000). Thinking about mechanisms.Philosophy of Science,
67, 1–25.
Mallal, S., Nolan, D., Witt, C., Masel, G., Martin, A., Moore, C., et al. (2002). Association between
presence of HLA-B*5701, HLA-DR7, and HLA-DQ3 and hypersensitivity to HIV-1 reverse-
transcriptase inhibitor abacavir. The Lancet, 359(9308), 727–732.
Pawson, R. (2003). Nothing as practical as a good theory. Evaluation, 9(4), 471–490.
Rauch, A., Nolan, D., Martin, A., McKinnon, E., Almeida, C., & Mallal, S. (2006). Prospective
genetic screening decreases the incidence of abacavir hypersensitivity reactions in the Western
Australian HIV cohort study. Clinical Infectious Diseases, 43(1), 99–102.
Russo, F., & Williamson, J. (2012). EnviroGenomarkers: The interplay between mechanisms and
difference making in establishing causal claims.Medicine Studies: International Journal for the
History, Philosophy and Ethics of Medicine and Allied Sciences, 3, 249–262.
Salmon, W. C. (1998). Causality and explanation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schwartz, G. G., Olsson, A. G., Abt, M., Ballantyne, C. M., Barter, P. J., Brumm, J., et al. (2012).
Effects of dalcetrapib in patients with a recent acute coronary syndrome. New England Journal
of Medicine, 367(22), 2089–2099.
Tardif, J.-C., Rhéaume, E., Perreault, L.-P. L., Grégoire, J. C., Zada, Y. F., Asselin, G., Provost, S.,
Barhdadi, A., Rhainds, D., L’Allier, P. L., Ibrahim, R., Upmanyu, R., Niesor, E. J., Benghozi,
R., Suchankova, G., Laghrissi-Thode, F., Guertin, M.-C., Olsson, A. G., Mongrain, I., Schwartz,
G. G., & Dubé, M.-P. (2015). Pharmacogenomic determinants of the cardiovascular effects of
dalcetrapib. Circulation: Genomic and Precision Medicine, 8(2), 372–382.
Wallmann, C.,&Williamson, J. (2017). Four approaches to the reference class problem. InG.Hofer-
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Chapter 3
How to Consider Evidence
of Mechanisms: An Overview
Abstract This chapter introduces how to assess evidence ofmechanisms, explaining
a summary protocol for use of evidence of mechanisms in assessing efficacy, then
external validity (developed theoretically in Part III, with tools for implementation
offered in Part II). An outline of quality assessment—of a whole body of evidence,
rather than individual studies—is given. The chapter finisheswith a brief introduction
to the ideas developed in Part III: gathering evidence of mechanisms (Chap. 5);
evaluating evidence of mechanisms (Chap. 6); and using evidence of mechanisms to
evaluate causal claims (Chap.7).
This section summarises the overall approach taken in this book. It develops some of
themore practical issues raised in the introduction (Chap.1) and begins to attach these
to the more theoretical discussions found in Part III. We start with an overview of
the way in which effectiveness can be evaluated. As discussed above, effectiveness
can be evaluated by evaluating efficacy and external validity. A translation of the
core ideas of this chapter to other arenas of practice, such as social policy, is readily
possible—although we do not attempt this here in the interest of clarity.
3.1 Questions to Address
The following protocol can be used to test a causal claim:
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Efficacy
Does the effect size and quality of clinical studies establish that the observed
correlation is causal?
Yes? Efficacy is established.
No?
• Evaluate other evidence for the claim that there exists an appropriate mecha-
nism that can explain the observed correlation.
– What are the hypothesised mechanisms?
– How well confirmed is each such mechanism? What are the gaps? How
well confirmed is each feature (process, entity, activity and organisational
feature) of the mechanism?
– Can the mechanism account for the full effect size? Are there counteracting
mechanisms? What is the evidence that the influence of any counteracting
mechanisms is less than that of the proposed mechanism?
• Evaluate other evidence to rule in or out other explanations of the correlation.
Are any remaining explanations better confirmed than the hypothesis that the
correlation is causal?
Efficacy is established if one can establish, in the study population, the exis-
tence of a correlation and the existence of a mechanism that can explain this
correlation.
External validity
Do clinical studies directly establish a suitable association and mechanism in
the target population?
Yes? Effectiveness is established.
No?
• Evaluate the claim that the mechanism of action is sufficiently similar in the
target and study populations.
• Evaluate the claim that in the target population, any counteractingmechanisms
that are not also present in the study population do not mask the effect of the
mechanism of action.
• Evaluate other evidence for a correlation in the target population.
External validity is established if one can establish similarity of relevant mech-
anisms in the study and target populations, and thereby establish, in the target
population, the existence of a correlation and the existence of a mechanism that
can explain this correlation.
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In the case of efficacy, it is rare that clinical studies alone establish that the
observed correlation is causal in the study population. Clinical research does not
(generally) take place in isolation from basic science research. Many aspects of the
design and interpretation of clinical trials—such as the choice of outcome measures,
therapeutic regimes compared, and patient recruitment criteria—are influenced by
evidence of mechanisms. Thus, even in the absence of complete knowledge of the
underlyingmechanisms, evidence ofmechanisms contributes to establishing efficacy
(Illari 2018). This is also true with with respect to external validity, where it is almost
never the case that clinical studies in the study population will directly establish both
a suitable association and mechanism that will apply to the the target population.
Rather, external validity inferences proceed in one of the following ways (Parkkinen
and Williamson 2017):
1. By identifying and comparing key details of the mechanisms in the study and
target populations.
2. Inductively, by observing a similar effect in many different experimental popula-
tions and generalizing from these to the target population (Wilde and Parkkinen
2017).
3. Phylogenetically, by identifying themechanism in the study population, and then
inferring that the mechanisms in the study and target population are similar due
to shared ancestry of the populations. The greater the degree of isolation between
the target population and the study population, the less reliable this inference
will be.
4. By means of a robustness argument: showing that the mechanism in the study
population is so robust, and differences between the study and target popula-
tions are so minor, that the mechanism of action will also obtain in the target
population.
Thus, for both efficacy and external validity one typically needs to consider evi-
dence ofmechanisms arising from sources other than the clinical studies that establish
a correlation in the study population. This means that those who evaluate evidence
will generally need to consider mechanistic studies, in addition to clinical studies, in
order to make causal judgements.
Of course, some features of a putativemechanismmay already bewell established,
in which case there will usually be no need to revisit the evidence for those features.
Other features will be more contentious. It is only by explicitly identifying these
features and the evidence that pertains to them that one can critically appraise a
proposed mechanism.
3.2 Quality of Evidence and Status of Claim
Quality of evidence. Evidence for various claims can be ranked by quality. We
distinguish three main kinds of claim: claims about correlation, claims about mech-
anisms and causal claims (including claims about efficacy and claims about external
validity). We use the scale in Table3.1 to rank the quality of this evidence.
26 3 How to Consider Evidence of Mechanisms: An Overview
Table 3.1 Quality levels of
evidence, based on Atkins
et al. (2004)
Quality level Interpretation
High Further research is highly unlikely to have
a significant impact on our confidence in
the claim
Moderate Further research is moderately unlikely to
have a significant impact on our
confidence in the claim
Low Further research is moderately likely to
have a significant impact on our
confidence in the claim
Very low Further research is highly likely to have a
significant impact on our confidence in the
claim
Note that this ranking system evaluates the total body of evidence pertaining to
the claim in question. This is in sharp contrast to other EBM methods that evaluate
single studies in isolation.
This approach to ranking quality on the basis of stability of confidence can be
found in the original GRADE framework (see Guyatt et al. 2008). According to this
sort of approach, establishing a causal claim requires confidence in the stability of
that causal claim, in addition to confidence in the nature of the claim itself.We should
emphasise that the interpretation of each category concerns the in principle possibility
of obtaining further research that changes confidence in the claim. A brief example
will be helpful here. Suppose current evidence warrants 75% confidence in a causal
claim. One then learns that there is further evidence which warrants a 25% change
in confidence, but one does not know the direction of this change. i.e., one does not
know whether this new evidence warrants 50% confidence or 100% confidence. The
75% confidence is not sufficiently stable for the claim to be considered established
or even provisionally established. This is because future evidence may be likely to
decide between the 50 and 100% confidence, leading to a large change in confidence
either way.
GRADE later changed their interpretation of quality levels, dropping reference
to the likelihood that further evidence will change confidence in the claim (Balshem
et al. 2011, Table2; Hultcrantz et al. 2017). This was because of concerns about the
situation in which further evidence is unlikely to be obtained in practice: if further
research is unlikely to be carried out then further research is unlikely to have an impact
on our confidence in the causal claim in question. This change is unnecessary: as
noted above, the key question is whether evidence can in principle be obtained to
significantly alter confidence in the claim. In short, just because ethical or practical
considerations make it very unlikely that further research on a particular claim will
be carried out, that does not imply that current evidence is high quality.
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Table 3.2 Status of a claim
Status Interpretation
Established A claim is established when community standards are met for
adding the claim to the body of evidence—i.e., for granting the
claim and treating it as evidence for other claims
In order to establish a claim, evidence must warrant a high level of
confidence in the claim and this evidence must itself be high quality
Provisionally established/
provisional
Moderate quality evidence warrants a high level of confidence in
the claim
Arguably true/ arguable The claim is neither established nor provisionally established, but
evidence of at least moderate quality warrants significantly more
confidence in the claim than in its negation, or low quality
evidence warrants a high level of confidence in the claim
Speculative A claim is speculative if it falls into none of the other categories
Arguably false The claim is neither ruled out nor provisionally ruled out, but
evidence of at least moderate quality warrants significantly more
confidence in the negation of the claim than in claim itself, or low
quality evidence warrants a high level of confidence in the negation
of the claim
Provisionally ruled out Moderate quality evidence warrants a high level of confidence in
the negation of the claim
Ruled out A claim is ruled out when community standards are met for adding
the negation of the claim to the body of evidence
In order to rule out a claim, high quality evidence must warrant a
high level of confidence in the negation of the claim
Status of claim. In addition to the quality of the evidence, we shall also be concerned
with the status that the evidence confers on the claim under consideration. The status
of a claim will be measured on the scale depicted in Table3.2.
Note that this table invokes two separate levels: the quality level applies to the
total evidence, while the level of confidence applies to the claim in question. The
status of the claim depends on both the quality of the evidence as well as the degree
of confidence that the evidence warrants.
We will see shortly that the status of a causal claim will depend on the status of
a correlation claim (assessed, e.g., by using the GRADE system) together with the
status of a mechanism claim (assessed by the procedures outlined in Chap. 6).
Appendix B provides a simple probabilistic interpretation of the notion of quality
and status developed in this section.
3.3 Overall Approach
Figure3.1 depicts the evidential relationships linking the concepts of this book;
cf. Williamson (2018b). A claim that A is a cause of B is assessed by evaluating
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Fig. 3.1 The evidential
relationships employed in
this book. See Williamson
(2018b)
Causal claim:








evidence of mech. features
Clinical studies:
measure A and B together
two further claims. The first—the correlation claim—is the claim that A and B are
appropriately correlated. The second is the general mechanistic claim. In the case
of efficacy, this is the claim that there exists an appropriate mechanism linking A
and B that can explain B in terms of A and that can account for the extent of the
correlation. There are two ways of confirming this general mechanistic claim: either
via clinical studies which find a correlation that can only be explained by the general
mechanistic claim being true, or by identifying key features of the actual mechanism
of action, which are confirmed bymechanistic studies. In the case of external validity,
the general mechanistic claim is the claim that the mechanisms of action in the study
and target population are sufficiently similar. Again, this can be confirmed either by
clinical studies on both populations that find similar correlations, or by ascertaining
key features of the mechanism of action in each population and finding that these
are similar. In addition, clinical studies provide good evidence of correlation, and,
in certain circumstances, an established mechanism of action can also provide good
evidence of correlation (Williamson 2018a, Sect. 2.2).
There is a correlation between two variables A and B if these two variables
are probabilistically dependent, i.e., P(B|A) = P(B). Inmany situationswhere
a causal relationship is being assessed, the correlation claim of interest is the
probabilistic dependence of A and B conditional on some set of a priori potential
confounding variables. A confounding variable is a variable correlated with
both A and B, such as a common cause of A and B. Note that ‘correlation’ is
sometimes used to refer to a linear dependence; here we use the term in the more
general sense to refer to any probabilistic dependence.
Specific mechanism hypothesis. This is a hypothesis of the form: a specific
mechanism with features F links the putative cause to the putative effect.
In contrast, other current EBM methods for evidence appraisal focus almost
exclusively on the evaluation of clinical studies, i.e., on the two arrows at the bot-
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Fig. 3.2 Evaluating efficacy
tom left of Fig. 3.1. Moreover, they tend to conflate these two arrows—they do not
distinguish the role of clinical studies in evaluating a correlation claim from their role
in determining whether there is some underlying mechanism of action. Once these
two roles are separated, it is clear that mechanistic studies also need to be appraised
when evaluating the latter general mechanistic claim. This is the evidential pluralism
introduced in Sect. 1.1.
Two flowcharts summarise the overall approach. Figure3.2 depicts the workflow
when evaluating efficacy. The second flowchart, Fig. 3.3, applies to the evaluation of
external validity. In each case there are three principal steps: gathering evidence of
mechanisms; evaluating evidence ofmechanisms; and using evidence ofmechanisms
to evaluate causal claims. Procedures for implementing the three steps are developed
in Chaps. 5, 6 and 7 respectively. The main ideas can be summarised as follows.
Gathering evidence of mechanisms (Chap. 5). It is typically more difficult to find
evidence of mechanisms in the literature than it is to find relevant evidence of cor-
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Fig. 3.3 Evaluating external validity
relation. This is because evidence of mechanisms is characteristically produced by
mechanistic studies, and there are a large number of diverse types of mechanistic
study (Smith et al. 2016). This makes the process of recognising good evidence more
difficult, because an investigator is likely to be unfamiliar with the details of all the
possible kinds of research that might be relevant to a clinical outcome. Historically,
as Evans (2002) has argued, database indexing practices for these studies have tended
to be unsystematic in comparison with those for clinical studies. Arguably, this has
contributed to a tendency to overlook or entirely ignore evidence of mechanisms that
arises from sources other than clinical studies.
However, as explained above, such evidence of mechanisms is often crucial to
establishing efficacy and external validity. Given this, the difficulties in gathering
evidence of mechanisms need to be overcome. As a first step towards overcoming the
difficulties, we propose a five-step strategy for identifying evidence of mechanisms,
a strategy that in part relies upon existing evidence of mechanisms:
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1. Identify: Identify a number of specific mechanism hypotheses.
2. Formulate: For each specific mechanism hypothesis, formulate a number of
review questions.
3. Search: Use these review questions to search the literature.
4. Refine: Identify the evidence most relevant to the mechanism hypothesis in ques-
tion by refining the results of this search.
5. Present: Present the evidence relevant to the mechanism hypothesis.
This strategy is intended to help overcome some of the practical difficulties of
identifying evidence of mechanisms—difficulties which may prevent practitioners
from considering all the evidence. We develop this strategy in more detail in Chap. 5.
We have also provided a series of tools in Part II that help users conduct certain parts
of this process in specified areas of practice.
Evaluating evidence of mechanisms (Chap. 6). In evaluating the quality of mech-
anistic evidence, the following questions are likely to be most helpful.
1. How well established and understood are the methods by which the evidence (of
existence of a mechanism or some of its features) was produced?
Well established methods whose functioning and potential biases are properly
understood and which can be calibrated against other well established meth-
ods typically provide higher quality evidence than methods that rely on novel
techniques that cannot be calibrated against better understood methods.
2. Can the item of evidence be produced by independent methods?
Employing several detection techniques and checking their results against each
other is a common way to distinguish experimental artefacts from valid results.
(The greater the number of independent methods that can confirm a result, the
higher the quality of an item of evidence.)
3. Are themodel systems that are used in experimental researchwell characterised?
Model systemsdonot usually exactly reproduce the relevant humanmechanisms.
Have the relevant differences been characterised for the system(s) used in this
research?
4. Can the mechanism be observed operating in many different background con-
texts?
The more robust a mechanism is against variation in background conditions,
the less likely it is that inferences based on evidence of the mechanism will err
because of unknown contextual factors interfering with the mechanism. Demon-
strable robustness of themechanism itself thusmakes for higher quality evidence.
Sections 6.1 and 6.2 describe a procedure for evaluating the quality ofmechanistic
studies that is broken down to three steps:
1. Evaluating methods
2. Evaluating the implementation of methods
3. Evaluating results
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The status of the general mechanistic claim is then assigned as follows. A mecha-
nism to account for efficacy can be considered established in two ways. First, when
high quality clinical studies exhibit a substantial correlation that is not explainable by,
e.g., confounding or bias.Alternatively,when there are high qualitymechanistic stud-
ies that confirm all the crucial component features of the mechanism. A hypothesised
mechanism for efficacy is considered ruled out when there is high quality evidence
against the existence of the component features of the mechanism. A mechanism
may also be ruled out if high quality clinical studies consistently fail to show results
one would expect if the mechanism was operating as hypothesised. A mechanism to
account for external validity is considered established when high quality evidence
establishes the similarity of all the crucial components of the mechanism in the study
and target populations. A mechanism hypothesised to account for external validity
is considered ruled out when there is high quality evidence of dissimilarity of mech-
anisms between the study and target populations. The more gaps or inconsistencies
there are in the evidence base for a particular claim about a mechanism, the lower
its status.
There are other useful status indicators that require slightly more careful judge-
ment. Provisionally established claims admit some gaps in the evidence base, but
require overall a good amount of high quality evidence. Arguable claims have evi-
dence in their support that is either moderate quality or that has important gaps.
Speculative claims are supported by evidence that shows mixed results, or have little
evidence in their support beyond theoretical intuition or speculation.
These issues are explained in more detail in Chap. 6.
Using evidence of mechanisms to evaluate causal claims (Chap. 7). Having ascer-
tained the status of a correlation claim and relevant mechanism claims, one can use
these to determine the status of the causal claim of interest. This process, which is
explored in Chap.7, may be summarised as follows.
In order to establish efficacy, one needs to establish that the putative cause and
effect are correlated and that there is amechanism that can account for this correlation.
More generally, one can take the status of a causal claim to be the minimum of the
status of the correlation claim and the status of the general mechanistic claim. For
instance, if a correlation is arguable but the existence of any underlying mechanism
is provisionally ruled out, then the causal claim itself is provisionally ruled out.
Turning to external validity, the situation is more complicated because one needs
to consider (i) evidence for the causal claimobtained directly on the target population,
(ii) evidence for efficacy in the study population, and (iii) evidence of similarity of
mechanismsbetween the study and the target populations. Evidencedirectly about the
target may be boosted (or undermined) by observing that efficacy does (or does not)
hold in a study population that shares similar mechanisms with the target population.
Table 7.1 combines the status of the causal claim in the target with the status of
efficacy in the study and the status of the claim that the mechanisms in the target and
the study are similar.
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Part II
Tools for Working with Mechanisms
Chapter 4
Tools
Abstract If theoretical developments in evidence assessment are to prove useful,
guidance on implementation is essential, and this chapter fills that need. A variety of
tools are offered, which can be used either in isolation, or in the various combinations
suggested. The starting point is an Is your policy really evidence-based? tool which
should be verywidely usable to give a very quick overview. Then two tools are offered
for guideline developers for medical practice; these offer improved assessment of
evidence of mechanism in assessing clinical trials, and, if needed, in basic science
papers. For politicians, journalists, academics, and so on, a critical appraisal tool is
offered alongside GRADE-style tables for mechanism assessment. A final tool is
designed specifically for public health and social care.
In this chapter, we present a number of tools for evaluating evidence of mecha-
nisms that have been tailored for different users. A flowchart that shows how these
tools can be used together is presented below in Fig. 4.1.
4.1 Introduction
How to use these tools
For most users, the Is your policy really evidence-based? tool (Sect. 4.2) will be the
best place to start, because it can give a quick indication of cases where a more
detailed review of evidence might be valuable. If a policy is found to have possible
weaknesses in its underlying evidence base, the user can then employ the other tools
provided here to produce a more thorough account of the strengths and weaknesses
of the policy’s evidence base. While we encourage interested users to experiment
with each of these tools to see which might best fit their purposes, we propose the
following provisional plan:
For those interested in guidelines for medical practice. We would encourage
these users tomove on to amore systematic review of evidence using theMechanisms
in Clinical Research appraisal tool (see Sect. 4.3). This might also involve a more
© The Author(s) 2018
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Fig. 4.1 A suggested work-flow for using the tools presented here
detailed review of evidence arising from basic science work using the Mechanisms
in Basic Science Research appraisal tool (see Sect. 4.4).
For those working on public health and social care guidelines. The Public
Health and Social Care tool (in Sect. 4.7) would be the most natural place to begin,
because it explicitly asks appraisers to evaluate evidence of mechanisms that pertains
both to individuals and to groups. Because of the diversity of the underlying research
in public health and social care policies, the Critical Appraisal Tool for Evidence of
Mechanisms would be the most useful tool to apply (see Sect. 4.5).
For those interested in other policies, such as politicians, journalists, and
academics. The most natural way to proceed would depend on the nature of the
policy in question. If the policy is largely medical (i.e. dealing with the effects of an
intervention on an individual, with a largely biological theme) then theMechanisms
in Clinical Research appraisal tool would be appropriate (see Sect. 4.3), perhaps
followed by theMechanisms in Basic Science Research appraisal tool (see Sect. 4.4).
Otherwise, the Critical Appraisal Tool for Evidence of Mechanisms (Sect. 4.5) could
be used in combination with the GRADE-style Tables for Mechanism Assessment
(Sect. 4.6) as a next step.
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Limitations of these tools
These tools are fallible, and their use is not a substitute for expert appraisal of a
guideline or policy. Answering each of the steps requires user judgement, and the
scores produced by each tool contribute to—rather than determine—the quality of
recommendations. In other words, the tool alonewill not provide a final and complete
judgement of the quality of evidence, and their use is not a substitute for expert
judgement.
These tools are specifically designed to assist in the evaluation of causal relation-
ships. Guidance that relies on the precautionary principle may therefore score poorly,
just because the precautionary principle is used when evidence of causal relation-
ships is limited. Those poor scores should not therefore be interpreted as sufficient
to alter such guidance.
These tools are currently beta versions that are suitable for testing. They have been
tested by the EBM+ team during development. We welcome feedback on these tools
via the EBM+ website at ebmplus.org. Feedback will help inform the next version
of these tools, which will be accessible from the EBM+ website.
4.2 Is Your Policy Really Evidence-Based?
Introduction
This is a tool for appraising a wide range of policy decisions. Policies are likely
to be more effective when they are based on evidence. But there are many kinds
of evidence, and many ways to use evidence. Just as not all kinds of evidence are
created equal, not all ways of using evidence are equally good. This tool permits the
user to draw rapid but useful conclusions about the evidence that a particular policy
is based on, and the way that it is based on this evidence.
Policies that use different kinds of evidence together, in an explicit and careful
way, are generally better justified than policies that do not. This tool allows the user to
quickly and fairly judgewhether their policy is evidence-based in this way.Whilst the
effectiveness of a policy is somewhat dependent on the strength of its evidence, other
factors are also significant. These include proper implementation, strict adherence,
and the responsiveness of policy updates.
Who should use this tool
This tool is a light-touch and rapid means of appraising the way that a recommen-
dation is supported by its evidence. It is intended for use on existing policies, rather
than being a tool for those constructing recommendations in the first instance. The
tool was written largely with medicine and social care in mind. For example, it asks
questions about evidence from basic science research because this plays an important
role in supporting policy in those areas. However, we acknowledge that other types
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of information are used in concert with evidence from scientific research in building
policies—this tool can accommodate a wide range of different needs and different
stakeholder groups working with issues of medical policy. It is envisaged that civil
servants, activists, political parties, What Works Centres, and guideline developers
will find this tool useful. The tool in table4.1 might also be valuable in other areas
(such as evaluating economic policy) with appropriate translation.
To provide some examples of ways that this tool might be used:
• Clinicians in primary care, public health, or social care, might use this tool as
a check when considering the implementation of a new clinical guideline, or in
other situations where rapid appraisals of guidelines might be otherwise helpful
(for example, in multidisciplinary team meetings).
• Patient groups might use this tool to aid discussions of new treatment recommen-
dations.
• Journalists might use the tool to begin investigating controversial policy decisions.
• Guideline authors might use this tool as a first step when considering revisions to
existing guidance.
• Decision makers in local authorities might choose to use this tool when making
decisions about service provision.
• Politicians (and their teams) could use this tool to evaluate theirmanifesto claims—
or those of their opponents.
• Directors of social care and public health might use this tool to evaluate existing
practices.
• This tool would be useful as part of a post-hoc effectiveness evaluation tool-kit
that could be applied to policies in the event of their failure.
It is important to remember that policy evolves and develops out of many actions
and involves many actors. This is true in democratic societies (where these interac-
tions are usually at least partially visible). It is also true in more closed societies,
where it is less easy to observe. In both cases, evidence and its appraisal are but one
part of the mix. The relationships have been studied by political scientists (King-
don and Thurber 1984), by policy makers themselves (National Audit Office 2003)
as well as social scientists more generally (Nutley et al. 2000). There are plentiful
models describing the process (Cooksey 2006; Ogilvie et al. 2009). The relationship
between evidence and policy is a complex one. This has to be acknowledged, but
that notwithstanding, it is important to apply the highest standards of evaluation we
can to the available evidence.
How to use this tool
This tool should be used when examining a specific policy or recommendation. For
example, wemight be interested in examining a claim that, for disease x in population
y use drug z. This policy will (hopefully) be supported by some group of research
evidence that shows that drug z is the most effective treatment for disease x.

























The tool then asks users a series of questions that reveal difficulties in the eviden-
tial support for that policy. These are ranked because failures in the early questions
reveal more serious difficulties than failures in the later questions. These steps cor-
respond to aspects of the account of how to gather, evaluate, and use, evidence of
mechanisms that is developed in Part III. There are seven steps, each with a simple
traffic-light checklist (green, yellow, or red) and each of which reflects one aspect
of the relationship between the recommendation and the evidence base. The overall
score for a particular policy can then be expressed by recording the lowest numbered
step in which the red box is checked. For example, a policy would score 3 if it were
found to be based on research on a population that was extremely unlike the intended
population for its use. Note that if no red boxes are checked for any of the questions
then the overall score should be noted as 7+, indicating that a policy is as evidence-
based as possible. Multiple yellow flags should indicate caution, and we suggest that
when three or more yellow flags are present, the score should be recorded as equal
to the stage at which the third yellow flag is indicated. This overall score gives an
extremely concise measure of the strength of the links between the evidence-base
and the recommendation. A fuller appraisal of the policy can also be easily seen by
consulting the full page of scores for each step. These initial appraisals can then form
a basis for more detailed appraisal using other tools, as detailed in Sect. 4.1.
4.3 Mechanisms in Clinical Research Appraisal Tool
Introduction
This tool presents a method that a researcher would use to evaluate a group of clini-
cal research publications. The aim of this method is to facilitate the construction of
concise summaries of the mechanistic aspects of a group of clinical research publi-
cations. These summaries can then be used by a panel of experts in the context of
making policy decisions about healthcare in combination with other data extraction
tools (such as GRADE). Note that this tool is not intended to produce a full recon-
struction of all the mechanisms that might be relevant. Instead, the summaries are
intended to reveal the mechanistic aspects of clinical research. For example, some
understanding of the hypothesised mechanism of action of a drug will inform the
design of a clinical trial testing that drug. These mechanistic assumptions should be
considered when interpreting this clinical trial.
This tool is comparatively simple, and therefore is intended for use in circum-
stances where the details of a mechanism are thought likely to be straightforward.
In cases where either a) the consequences of a policy decision are rather serious
(such as making decisions about medicines for use in pregnancy) or b) when the
research base that grounds a body of clinical research is disputed or complex (such
as the evaluation of treatments for chronic fatigue syndrome) we suggest that a more
detailed appraisal be conducted using our Mechanisms in Basic Science Research
appraisal tool (see Sect. 4.4). A more theoretical approach to the appraisal process
can be found in Fig. 5.1.
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Who should use this tool
This tool is intended for use during the development of clinical guidelines. Parts of
this tool can be used by different groups as the process of guideline development
proceeds. The data extraction parts of this tool (A1–A3, as well asA5 if used) may be
of use to literature review specialists alongside existing appraisal work. While these
parts of the tool do assume some expertise in dealing with the medical literature, we
donot assumedomain-specific expertise in these parts. Parts of this tool—particularly
A4—do assume a higher level of expertise in some specified scientific domain, and
this stage will largely be carried out by domain experts. Finally, A6 is intended to be
carried out by those with expertise in producing guidance from clinical research.
This tool has been designed with the current (2018) practices of NICE as an
archetype. We understand that practices vary in different contexts, and that the
demands of a different context of practice might produce difficulties in using this
tool.
How to use this tool
We describe a six-stage method for using this tool. The numbers of the stages (e.g.
A3) are also shown on the flowchart in Fig. 4.2 to assist in understanding the over-
all appraisal process. Each of the stages will help evaluate the evidence-base that
supports (or undermines) a drug’s safety and efficacy. Note that not all steps will
be necessary in each case. Instead, this process is adaptable to suit cases where the
evidence base is favourable, or cases where the evidence base is unfavourable, or
cases where the evidence base is more mixed. Note too that different stages of the
process are likely to be carried out by different evaluators. We have designed this
tool to assist smooth transitions between evaluators. An overview of the intended
process is below.
A1: collate clinical studiesAt this stage, the process is identical to that of traditional
publication screening. A set of search terms should be selected, and applied to pub-
lished and unpublished studies. Duplicates should be excluded, and then appropriate
selection criteria (e.g. study language, age of study) should be applied. This will
result in a group of clinical studies that we call the appraisal stack.
A2: extract data relating to mechanisms from these studies Using Table4.2, data
should then be extracted from this stack of clinical studies. This will serve to identify
both the content and quality of these studies. Again, we envisage that this step will
accompany existing data collection protocols that are used in guideline development.
Data collection should take place for each one of the reviewed studies, and a data
summary table containing data summaries for each article should be produced.
A3: review data for gaps Using the completed data summary table, the analyst can
then make some preliminary recommendations regarding the set of clinical research
papers as a whole. These tools will particularly help to determine whether there
are problems about the mechanistic aspects of this corpus of literature. We foresee








































































Establishedmechanisms: in cases where a group of clinical research papers appears
to be explicitly based on a knownmechanism, and where there is ample discussion of
that mechanism in the basic science research literature, no further investigation will
generally be required, and the user should proceed directly to stage four. A special
case might be where the clinical studies appear to rely on the same mechanism, but
where there is no explicit justification of that mechanism. Users in this case should
make explicit note of this, and refer the issue to an expert panel (A4) as a possible
precursor to a more developed mechanism search.
Other cases: in cases where the clinical research literature does not link neatly to an
established mechanism, a more detailed search for a mechanism will generally be
helpful to guideline authors. In this case, proceed to A5.
A4: expert review The data summary table should now be passed to domain experts
for review. One important question at this stage is to ensure that the selection of
publications examined at stage A3 is fair and unbiased. So the experts should satisfy
themselves that no cherry-picking of the research literature has taken place, and that
the data extraction has fairly summarised the state of knowledge in the relevant field.
If this is not the case, proceed toA5 to conduct a more detailed mechanism search. If
the domain experts are satisfied, this verified data summary table can then be passed
on to a guidelines panel for use in their deliberations in A6.
A5:mechanism searchConduct a more detailed mechanism search using theMech-
anisms in Basic Science Research Appraisal Tool to address gaps in the clinical
research literature. This will frequently require consultation with domain experts
for search term scoping and expert review. Once complete, the mechanisms data,
together with the clinical data summary table, should be passed to an expert review
panel for approval before moving to A6.
A6: implementation/recommendation/reviewstageThedata summary table should
then be used, in concert with other data extraction tools (and, if applicable, a sum-
mary ofmechanisms data), in formulating recommendations.Here, the data summary
tool is designed to facilitate panel discussions about the strengths and weaknesses
of individual studies, as well as to assist with more overarching decisions about
recommendations.
As discussed above, use of the Mechanisms in Basic Science Research tool may
be necessary in some appraisals. Figure4.2 provides an overview of the integrated
use of these two tools.
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4.4 Mechanisms in Basic Science Research Appraisal Tool
Introduction
This tool presents a method that a researcher would use to evaluate a mechanistic
claim about a drug treatment as it appears in the basic science literature. The aim
is to facilitate the construction of concise summaries for a group of basic science
publications. These summaries can then be used alongside similar summaries of
clinical research by a panel of experts in the context of making policy decisions. Note
that this tool is not intended to produce a full reconstruction of all the mechanisms
that might be relevant. Instead, the summaries will indicate the degree to which the
published evidence supports some mechanism. As mechanisms frequently inform
the design and interpretation of clinical trials, these summaries of evidential support
for mechanistic claims that might be found in clinical research will enable a policy
panel—with appropriate expert input—to appropriately evaluate both clinical and
basic science research together in an integrated way.
This tool is comparatively detailed, and is therefore largely intended for use in
circumstanceswhere the details of amechanismare particularly contentious.Broadly,
this might be when either a) the consequences of a policy decision are rather serious
(such as making decisions about medicines for use in pregnancy) or b) when the
research base that grounds a body of clinical research is disputed or complex (such
as the evaluation of treatments for chronic fatigue syndrome).Mechanisms of interest
in more simple cases are likely to be dealt with adequately by our Mechanisms in
Clinical Research appraisal tool.
Who should use this tool
This tool is intended for use during the development of clinical guidelines. Parts of this
tool can be usedbydifferent groups as the process of guideline development proceeds.
The data extraction parts of this tool (B2 and B3) are likely to be largely carried out
by literature review specialists alongside existing appraisal work. While these parts
of the tool do assume some expertise in dealing with the medical literature, we do
not assume domain-specific expertise in these parts. Parts of this tool, particularly
B1, B4, and B6, do assume a higher level of expertise in some specified scientific
domain, and this stage will largely be carried out by domain experts. Finally, B1 and
B6 will generally require close collaboration between literature review specialists,
and domain experts.
How to use this tool
We describe a six-stage method for using this tool. Not all steps will be necessary in
each case.We generally intend this tool to follow on from issues identified during the
use of the Mechanisms in Clinical Research Appraisal Tool (see Sect. 4.3), and this
guide assumes that this is the case. Please also see the overview flowchart (Fig. 4.2)
to understand the overall appraisal process.
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B1: identify a positedmechanism Begin with a clinical research paper (or appraisal
stack from the clinical tool). Then retrieve citations from the clinical paper(s) that
describe key assumptions about mechanisms. These might include:
• Mechanism of action
• Biomarkers
• Patient population recruitment criteria
• Surrogate outcome measures
If no mechanism is described in the clinical research paper(s), or if the user is using
this tool independently of the clinical research tool, expert advice is desirable at this
stage to assist with the identification of a mechanism.
B2: retrieve papers Retrieve basic science papers (identified in B1). Then iden-
tify the purpose that these basic science papers are used for in the relevant clinical
paper(s).
B3: data extraction Using Table4.3, extract data from the relevant basic science
papers identified in B2. Repeat for all basic science papers.
B4: expert review Pass data tables to experts for review to verify that the extraction
has fairly summarised the relevant field. One important question at this stage is to
ensure that the selection of publications examined at stage B3 is fair and unbiased.
Domain experts should satisfy themselves that no cherry-picking of the research
literature has taken place. If extraction has not fairly summarised the field then
proceed to B5. If however the experts are satisfied, then this verified data can then
be passed to the guidelines panel for use in their deliberations. If problems and
inconsistencies are revealed during this process, proceed to B6.
B5: enhanced search (for cases where the cited literature is unrepresentative
of a field) Conduct a keyword search on the mechanism (see also Chapter 5). This
should then be followed by applying stages B1 to B4 to the updated group of basic
science papers found by this keyword search.
B6: combined search (for cases where the clinical and basic sciences literature
are divergent) Conduct a combined search across both clinical and basic science
material, concentrating on the connection between different kinds of evidence with
respect to a claim. This will require input from experts for both the clinical and basic
science material.
Once completed, the data summaries from this tool should be passed back to
the relevant guideline panel, ideally in combination with the relevant clinical data
summary table.























4.5 Critical Appraisal Tool for Evidence of Mechanisms
Introduction
This tool presents a method for critical appraisal of mechanistic evidence which
is modelled on the EBM critical appraisal worksheets publicly available at the
Oxford Centre for Evidence-Based Medicine website. This aim is to provide a inte-
grated way of evaluating the processes of gathering, evaluating, and using, evidence
of mechanisms to determine the status of a causal claim. The tool is intended to
be used in a stand-alone way, ideally in concert with an evaluation of other forms
of evidence that might bear on a causal claim of interest. The theoretical details of
these evaluations are explained in later parts of this book (see Chaps. 5, 6, and 7
respectively).
Who should use this tool
The tool is fairly, rather than very, detailed. It is a sensible next-step from the Is Your
Policy Really Evidence-Based tool (Sect. 4.2) for many purposes, although we would
particularly recommend it as a tool for use in contexts that are not directly related to
developing healthcare guidelines. The Mechanisms in Clinical Research appraisal
tool (Sect. 4.3) would be better fitted to these purposes (Table4.4).
How to use this tool
The tool consists of eight questions. Each is accompanied with a note of guidance
about both how to interpret the question (and showing how the specific question
fits in with the evaluation process), as well as some notes of guidance about where
to find information that will contribute to answering the question posed. Together,
these questions can help reveal the strength of evidential support for some specific
mechanism hypothesis.
4.6 GRADE-Style Tables for Mechanism Assessment
Introduction
One widely used approach to assessing and summarizing quality of evidence and
strength of recommendations in systematic reviews and clinical practice guide-
lines is the Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development and Evaluation
(GRADE) system (Guyatt et al. 2011), used for example by NICE (NICE 2014). The
GRADE process involves collecting evidence to address a specific question about
specific outcomes, and rating the quality of evidence according to the quality of study
design, risk of bias, imprecision, inconsistency of findings, indirectness (relative to
the target population), and magnitude of effect. The quality of evidence and strength
of recommendation is then summarized in a table. GRADE tables do not include an
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explicit assessment of mechanistic evidence. In this tool we provide some examples
of ways in which one might extend GRADE evidence profile tables to also include
evidence of mechanisms. The proposed amendments are modelled according to the
categories used in the GRADE tables. These amended tables illustrate that it is pos-
sible to incorporate many aspects of the approach of this book into a popular system
like GRADE, without having to make any radical changes.
GRADE-style table for mechanism assessment
Who should use this tool
This tool is intended for use in cases where a systematic review of evidence is being
conducted as part of policy development. Thus this tool is intended for a fairly expert
audience, with the assumption that users will be generally familiar with current
best practice in evidence appraisal. This tool is therefore an ideal step-up from the
less thorough assessment that a researcher might have produced using either the Is
your policy really evidence-based? (Sect. 4.2) and/or the Critical appraisal tool for
evidence of mechanisms (Sect. 4.5).
How to use this tool
Table4.5 provides a template for an augmented GRADE-style table. We assume that
a user is generally familiar with the current GRADE method for evidence appraisal.
This augmented table is intended to be used a similar way. However, as it contains
some questions which are likely to be unfamiliar, we have provided some notes of
guidance here on these proposed new categories.


























Note that providing answers to these questions may require substantial investi-
gation, particularly in cases where the relevant mechanisms are unclear or disputed.
The Clinical Research (Sect. 4.3) and Basic Science (Sect. 4.4) tools may be of value
in such cases.
Mechanism hypothesis. If the quality of clinical studies is high, and observed
effect sizes sufficiently large, there may be no need to formulate and evaluate specific
mechanism hypotheses. Otherwise, each specific hypothesisedmechanism should be
sketched here.
Gaps. Crucial features of the specific mechanism hypothesis that are lacking
evidence, or for which there is high risk that the available evidence is biased due to
methodological limitations of the studies.
Masking. Evidence of mechanisms that counteract the effect of the hypothesized
mechanism. This will reduce the plausibility of the intervention having a robust effect
through the proposed mechanism.
Inconsistency. Evidence for feature(s) of a mechanism is inconsistent when there
is some evidence in favour of a feature of a mechanism, and some against it, or
when there is evidence for two or more mutually exclusive mechanisms. Note that
inconsistency should be evaluated taking into account the amount and quality of
evidence—e.g., if some of the conflicting evidence is systematically significantly
less reliable due to study limitations, the inconsistency is not to be considered as
severe.
Indirectness. Evidence relating to other populations and evidence of crucial dif-
ferences between mechanisms in those populations and mechanisms in the target
population.
In the quality and status box, one should state the overall quality of the mecha-
nistic studies and the status of the specific mechanism hypothesis given the evidence
(see Sect. 3.2 and Chap.6). Any outstanding study limitations can be summarized
here.
The overall assessment box should include an evaluation of the status of the gen-
eral mechanistic claim, and should discuss how this informs the overall assessment
of the status of the effectiveness claim. See Sect. 6.3 and Chap.7.
Worked example
Table4.6 depicts a worked example of this GRADE-style appraisal, which is an
assessment of brief contact interventions for reducing self-harm. Further worked
examples can be found in Appendix C.
































































4.7 Public Health and Social Care Tool
Introduction
This is a tool for appraising public health and social care policies, which differ in
manyways from the kinds of interventions that are used in clinicalmedicine. This tool
will help the authors and evaluators of these policies ensure that their interventions
are as closely connected to underlying research in the relevant sectors (Fig. 4.3) as
possible. Users of this tool may find the discussion of mechanisms in public health
in Chap.9 a helpful adjunct to this tool.
Public Health and Social Care tool
Who should use this tool
This tool is largely aimed at experts in public health and social care policy. It assumes
a fairly high level of knowledge of the research that might be relevant for appraising
a policy, and requires the user to exercise their judgement in evaluating that evidence.
It is also a comparatively detailed process. A better alternative tool for contexts where
a lighter review of evidence is thought to be sufficient is the Is your policy really
evidence-based? tool found in Sect. 4.2.
How to use this tool
This tool can be employed as a way of checking the alignment between the available
evidence of mechanisms and policy guidance. It is thus intended to help resolve
problems regarding the external validity of research, and will help researchers be
confident that their recommendationswill be applicable to their population of interest.
Fig. 4.3 Our understanding
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Note that the tool presupposes that population-based research (such as trials of an
intervention) will be evaluated using other methods such as GRADE.
Part one of the tool (Table4.7) asks the user to provide three sets of prelimi-
nary information: about the public health problem that the proposed intervention is
intended to affect, about the nature of the intervention itself, and about the population
that this intervention is meant to be applied to.
Part two of the tool (Table4.8) then asks the user to answer questions about
the evidence that bears on each of these preliminary information from part one.
These questions about the evidence are divided along two axes—individual/group
and biological/social. Ideally, the user should be satisfied that there are no identifiable
problems in either of the four quadrants.
Note that the questions in the tools may be hard to answer in some cases. For
example, research on social mechanisms may be lacking. Or, for new risks, the
research base might be very slender. To offer a note of reassurance from our testing,
difficulties in gathering relevant research should be regarded as a positive finding in
the context of this tool.
Other parts of this book may be a helpful addition to this tool, depending on the
case at hand. The Critical Appraisal Tool for Evidence of Mechanisms (in Sect. 4.5)
Table 4.7 Part one: preliminary questions for Public Health and Social Care appraisal
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Table 4.8 Part two: evidence questions for Public Health and Social Care appraisal
and the GRADE-style Tables for Mechanism Assessment (in Sect. 4.6) would be
particularly appropriate next-steps.
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Gathering Evidence of Mechanisms
Abstract In this chapter we put forward more theoretical proposals for gather-
ing evidence of mechanisms. Specifically, the chapter covers the identification of a
number of mechanism hypotheses, formulation of review questions for search, and
then how to refine and present the resulting evidence. Key issues include increased
precision concerning the nature of the hypothesis being examined, attention to dif-
ferences between the study population (or populations) and the target population of
the evidence assessors, and being alert for masking mechanisms, which are other
mechanisms which may mask the action of the mechanism being assessed. An out-
line example concerning probiotics and dental caries is given. (Databases that may
be helpful for some searches can be found online in Appendix A).
In the next three chapters, we develop core principles for evaluating efficacy and
external validity. In this chapter we put forward proposals for gathering evidence of
mechanisms. Then, in Chap. 6 we discuss how to evaluate this evidence. In Chap. 7,
we explain how this evaluation can be combined with an evaluation of correlation in
order to produce an overall evaluation of a causal claim.
In the case of efficacy,where clinical studies find a correlation between the putative
cause and effect, the task is to determine whether this correlation is causal by looking
for further evidence of mechanisms. In order to evaluate efficacy, it is necessary
to determine the status of the general mechanistic claim, i.e., to ask whether the
correlated putative cause and effect are also linked by a mechanism that can account
for the extent of the observed correlation.
In the case of external validity, the existing evidence may establish causality in a
study population that differs from the target population of interest. Here the relevant
general mechanistic claim that needs to be evaluated is that mechanisms in the study
and target population are sufficiently similar.
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Generalmechanistic claim for efficacy. In formulating the generalmechanistic
claim for efficacy, the following questions should be addressed:
• What is the relevant population?
• What is the intervention or exposure level?
• What is the outcome and how is it measured?
General mechanistic claim for external validity. In determining the general
mechanistic claim concerning external validity, the following questions should
be addressed:
• What is the target population? What is the study population?
• What is the intervention or exposure level in the target?
• What is the outcome and how is it measured in the target?
• What is the intervention or exposure level in the study?
• What is the outcome and how is it measured in the study?
It may be that existing evidence from clinical studies together with already well-
establishedmechanisms is enough to establish the generalmechanistic claim. In other
cases, the existing evidence fails to establish causality, and it is necessary to identify
and evaluate mechanistic studies. To this end, this chapter presents the following
five-step strategy for gathering evidence of mechanisms:
1. Identify: Identify a number of specific mechanism hypotheses.
2. Formulate: For each specific mechanism hypothesis, formulate a number of
review questions.
3. Search: Use these review questions to search the literature.
4. Refine: Identify the evidence most relevant to the mechanism hypothesis by
refining the results of this search.
5. Present. Present the evidence relevant to the mechanism hypothesis.
This strategy is intended to help overcome some of the practical difficulties with
identifying evidence ofmechanisms—difficultieswhichmayprevent appraisers from
considering all the relevant evidence. Once this evidence of mechanisms has been
identified, it can then be evaluated alongside the existing evidence of correlation
from clinical studies, as explained in Chaps. 6 and 7.
The overall approach of this chapter is illustrated inFig. 5.1. Thefive steps outlined
above are explained in detail in the following sections.
5.1 Identify Specific Mechanism Hypotheses
Efficacy. In order to evaluate the general mechanistic claim that there is a mechanism
that can account for the observed correlation between a putative cause and effect
in a study population, it is useful to identify key features of possible mechanisms






















and the general mecha-
nistic claim (Chapter 6)
yes
no
Fig. 5.1 The overall approach to gathering evidence of mechanisms
of action. Each proposed mechanism of action, or partial description of proposed
mechanism of action, is a specific mechanism hypothesis. But note that a specific
mechanism hypothesis need not be a complete description of a mechanism.
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Example: Specific mechanism hypotheses for determining efficacy.
Aspirin prevents heart disease via cyclooxygenase (COX) inhibition, and the
mechanisms that underlie this prevention are established. However, aspirin
also seems to reduce the incidence of some cancers. Here, the mechanisms are
much less well understood. As Chan et al. (2011) write: “the mechanism of
aspirin’s antineoplastic effect is less clear, with substantial evidence support-
ing both COX-dependent and COX-independent mechanisms. Moreover, data
supporting the importance of COX-dependent mechanisms are not entirely
consistent concerning the relative importance of the COX-1 and COX-2 iso-
forms in carcinogenesis”. In this quotation, the general mechanistic claim is
that aspirin exhibits an antineoplastic effect. There are also a couple of more
specific mechanism hypotheses, for example, that this antineoplastic effect is
mediated by COX-dependent mechanisms. Evidence relating to these more
specific mechanism hypotheses provides a way to determine the status of the
general mechanistic claim.
External validity. In order to evaluate the general mechanistic claim that there is a
mechanism in the target population sufficiently similar to the mechanism responsible
for the correlation observed in the study population, specific mechanism hypotheses
need to pertain to the mechanism of action. It is important to consider the possibility
that the mechanism in the target population may contain further component mecha-
nisms that counteract the mechanism of action in the study population and affect the
extent of the correlation between the putative cause and effect. So one needs to ask,
are there any masking mechanisms in the target population?
Example: Specific mechanism hypotheses for determining external validity.
According to NICE guidelines, treatment for hypertension should differ
depending on ethnicity (NICE 2011). Although ACE-inhibitors have proved
beneficial for hypertension in many study populations, there remains the ques-
tion of whether they are the optimal treatment in some distinct target popula-
tion, such as African or Caribbean populations. In this case, it is necessary to
determine the status of the following general mechanistic claim: the relevant
hypertensive mechanisms in the study populations are sufficiently similar to
themechanisms inAfrican or Caribbean populations. This generalmechanistic
claim can be evaluated by evaluating a more specific mechanism hypothesis,
namely that African and Caribbean populations have a lower renin state. As we
shall see in Chap. 6, there is some good mechanistic evidence in favour of this
specific mechanism hypothesis, and this undermines the general mechanistic
claim. This is why, instead, calcium channel blockers are the recommended
antihypertensive treatment in African and Caribbean populations (Clarke et al.
2014).
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There are two main ways to identify a specific mechanism hypothesis.
First, a specific mechanism hypothesis may be proposed on the basis of published
studies from the clinical study literature. If a clinical study establishes a correlation
between a putative cause and effect, and the suggestion is that this correlation is
causal, then the authors of such a study usually identify at least one possible mecha-
nism hypothesis of the following form: It is plausible that mechanism with features F
links the putative cause and effect in the study population. The study may also point
out possible masking mechanisms (Illari 2011). Given this, the discussion section of
a published paper that reports the results of a clinical study is a good place to look
in order to locate a specific mechanism hypothesis.
Example: The discussion section of a recent paper on the effect of long-term
aspirin use on the risk of cancer says: ‘[O]ur findings suggest that for the
gastrointestinal tract, aspirin may influence additional mechanisms critical to
early tumorigenesis that may explain the stronger association of aspirin with
a lower incidence of gastrointestinal tract cancer. Such mechanisms include
modulation of cyclo-oxygenase-2, the principal enzyme that produces proin-
flammatory prostaglandins, including prostaglandin E2, which increases cel-
lular proliferation, promotes angiogenesis, and increases resistance to apopto-
sis. Aspirin may also play a role in Wnt signaling, nuclear factor B signaling,
polyamine metabolism, and DNA repair’ (Cao et al. 2016). References are
given for these specific mechanism hypotheses.
Second, a specific mechanism hypothesis may also be proposed on the basis of
existing mechanistic studies or clinical expertise.
Example: Large goitres may make it difficult to breathe. It has recently been
established that radiotherapy leads to a reduction in the size of large nodular
goitres (Nielsen et al. 2006; Bonnema et al. 2007). Will reducing the size of
goitres lead to improved respiratory function? Basic clinical experience sug-
gests that there is a mechanism by which a reduction in the size of obstructions
in the airway leads to an improvement in respiratory function. This was not
established on the basis of clinical studies, but rather on very basic clinical
experience. A proponent of this viewmay propose that this clinical experience
supports the existence of a mechanism by which radiotherapy makes a pos-
itive difference to respiratory function in patients with large nodular goitres,
since large nodular goitres are simply a type of obstruction in the airway that
results from an enlargement of the thyroid. However, it may also be proposed
that there is a possible masking mechanism. Radiotherapy to the throat might
otherwise reduce respiratory function (by, say, causing scarring). A propo-
nent of this view might propose this masking mechanism which may affect
the extent of the correlation between radiotherapy and improved respiratory
function (Bonnema et al. 2007).
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It is important to bear in mind the following practical point. Many policy-makers
require an expert evaluation of evidence in their process. For instance, expert evalua-
tions routinely take place at the InternationalAgency forResearch onCancer (IARC),
the UK Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA), the UK
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), and the EU Committee
for Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP). In such cases, it may be useful
to provide a list of specific mechanism hypotheses to committee members before
gathering evidence, in order to give them the opportunity to suggest alterations to
the list well in advance of the committee actually meeting (Aronson et al. 2018).
Identifying a set of specific mechanism hypotheses at the outset is a good way of
proceeding in the face of a large number of mechanistic studies: it makes the process
of gathering evidence more manageable by helping to restrict focus to only those
published mechanistic studies potentially relevant to the mechanism hypotheses of
interest.
5.2 Formulate the Review Questions
An effective method for carrying out a review of the literature begins with a well-
formulated review question. The suggestion here is to use the specific mechanism
hypotheses to help formulate a number of review questions.
Two points are important to keep in mind:
1. Some features of the proposed mechanism may already be established, so it
would be unnecessary to look for further evidence in favour of them. Such fea-
tures should not figure in themore specific reviewquestions.Only the contentious
key features of the proposed mechanism should figure in the review question.
2. The reviewquestionsmayneed to beupdated in the course of the literature search.
In particular, the search may suggest some more specific review questions about
the entities, activities, and their organization in the proposed mechanism. Any
changes to the review questions should be documented.
Example: A number of clinical studies establish that there is a correlation
between exposure to benzo[a]pyrene and lung cancer, because exposure to
benzo[a]pyrene is correlated with tobacco smoking, which is itself correlated
with lung cancer (IARC 2009). But these studies alone were not sufficient to
establish causation (IARC 2015). A number of specificmechanism hypotheses
might explain the correlation between benzo[a]pyrene and cancer: e.g., (i) The
diolepoxide mechanism; (ii) The radical-cation mechanism. These hypotheses
lead to the following review questions concerning contentious key features of
the respective mechanisms: (i) Do intermediate metabolites of benzo[a]pyrene
react with DNA to form DNA adducts associated with tumorigenesis? (ii) Is
benzo[a]pyrene oxidized in such a way that leads to free radical formation
which may in turn form DNA adducts? These review questions can then be
used to search the literature.
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The review questionsmay be formulated according to the PICO framework. PICO
stands for Population, Intervention, Comparator, andOutcome (formore information
see O’Connor et al. (2011)).
Supposewe are interested in the following research question: Is there amechanism
in women over fifty linking regularly taking aspirin (rather than not regularly taking
aspirin) to developing asthma? The PICO framework helps in a number of ways
to answer this question, by emphasizing what are the most important parts of the
research question. Specifically, it picks out the relevant population (women over
fifty), the intervention in that population of interest (regularly taking aspirin), and the
outcome (developing asthma). It will also identify the comparator (asthma prevalence
in members of the same population not regularly taking aspirin). This has the effect
of making clear the most important aspects of the intended research objective. In
turn, this focuses the search on the most relevant literature, as well as assisting in the
presentation of the literature that is obtained by the search.
The PICO framework may be adapted to the research objective at hand. In par-
ticular, the PECO framework has been developed for non-interventional studies:
Population, Exposure, Comparator, and Outcome (Vandenberg et al. 2016). One can
ask, for instance: is there amechanism in humanmales (population) linking exposure
to high levels of benzo[a]pyrene (exposure) rather than low levels of benzo[a]pyrene
(comparator) to scrotal cancer (outcome)?
5.3 Search the Literature
A review question can then be used to search the literature for evidence for the
contentious key features of a specific mechanism hypothesis. This should take place
with the assistance of domain experts.
At this stage, decisions need to be made about which databases and other sources
should be searched. These decisions should be documented in order to aid trans-
parency and reproducibility. (See Appendix A for some examples of databases, Part
II for tools to support the process of evidence appraisal, and Sect. 5.6 for a worked
example of a literature search.)
One can identify research potentially relevant to the assessment of the specific
mechanism hypothesis by looking at the relevant mechanistic study literature:
1. In the first instance, this may be done by following up the references from the
discussion section of any clinical study report which proposes a mechanism
as the best explanation of an observed correlation. Any other publicly available
reportsmay be useful here also, e.g., government agency reports, doctoral theses,
etc.
2. More systematically, a preferred method for searching the literature may be
used, e.g., a PubMed search using appropriateMedical Subject Heading (MeSH)
terms, including key terms from the hypothesized mechanisms.
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Efforts to standardise terminology and indexing practices for publications report-
ing mechanistic studies are welcome, especially in order to facilitate text mining
techniques, which are becoming increasingly widespread. It is also important that
even the negative findings of mechanistic studies are published, to reduce publication
bias.
5.4 Refine Results of the Search
Identifying evidence from the literature requires expert judgement, which is sus-
ceptible to bias. In order to guard against the effects of such biases, the details of
the search procedure should be clearly presented (O’Connor et al. 2011). This pro-
tects against the effects of bias by providing a transparent and reproducible literature
search strategy (Vandenberg et al. 2016).
A study flow diagram can be used to present the process of selecting studies for
inclusion in the review (O’Connor et al. 2011). This can be made with reference
to the guidance in the PRISMA framework (Moher et al. 2009). According to this
guidance, a study flow diagram consists of four phases: Identification, Screening,
Eligibility, and Inclusion. After identifying studies by searching databases with a
review question, the studies are then screened for duplicates, and excluded studies
are recorded. The eligibility of the studies is then determined, and any ineligible
studies are recorded as excluded along with the reasons for their exclusion. This
leaves the included studies.
A key question here is: Is any of this evidence not relevant?
1. Use preferred inclusion and exclusion criteria and expert knowledge to rule
out irrelevant mechanistic studies (Kushman et al. 2013).
• Does the publication include original data? A good rule of thumb: if it
does not include original data, then exclude the publication.
2. It may be possible to exclude some studies by a review of the title and
abstract. A full-text review may be necessary to exclude other studies.
• All excluded studies should be documented, along with the reasons for
exclusion.
3. There are content management tools available to help in identifying, screen-
ing, organizing, and summarizing the evidence.
• For example: Health Assessment Workspace Collaborative (HAWC).
See: https://hawcproject.org/.
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Fig. 5.2 An example study flow diagram reproduced from Vandenberg et al. (2016)
An example study flow diagram for evidence of mechanisms is presented in Fig. 5.2
(Vandenberg et al. 2016).
5.5 Presenting the Evidence of Mechanisms
A clear summary of the identified evidence of mechanisms is an important precursor
to evaluating that evidence. (Presenting the quality of evidence of mechanisms is a
separate issue, for which guidance is provided in Sect. 6.4.) A summary of evidence
ofmechanisms should clearly state the general mechanistic claim that themechanism
in question is proposed to account for, that is, whether it is presented as evidence
of the existence of a mechanism of action for efficacy, or as evidence of similarity
of mechanisms between populations to account for external validity. This includes
a clear statement of the cause A under investigation as well as the particular out-
come B of interest. The presentation of evidence should also make clear the specific
mechanism hypotheses under consideration, and present the evidence in favour of
the contentious key features of the specific mechanism hypotheses.
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Example: IARC’s overall process of gathering and presenting evidence of
mechanisms.
In order to help identify and organise further evidence of mechanisms in the
literature, the International Agency for Research on Cancer makes use of exist-
ing evidence of mechanisms in the form of ten key characteristics, one or more
of which are frequently exhibited by known carcinogens (Smith et al. 2016). In
our terminology, the ten key characteristics are key features of specific mecha-
nism hypotheses, which are possible instantiations of the general mechanistic
claim that there is a mechanism linking the considered exposure to cancer in
the relevant sites in humans. The ten key characteristics are the ability of the
putative carcinogen to:
1. Act as an electrophile either directly or after metabolic activation;
2. Be genotoxic;
3. Alter DNA repair or cause genomic instability;
4. Induce epigenetic alterations;
5. Induce oxidative stress;
6. Induce chronic inflammation;
7. Be immunosuppressive;
8. Modulate receptor-mediated effects;
9. Cause immortalization;
10. Alter cell proliferation, cell death, or nutrient supply.
For instance, a correlation between benzene and cancer in humans has been
observed in many studies. In order to determine whether this correlation is
causal, it is necessary to determine the status of the relevant general mechanis-
tic claim, namely, that there exists a mechanism linking exposure to benzene
to cancer in humans that can account for the extent of the observed correlation
(IARC 2015). A first step is to propose specific mechanism hypotheses, with
the help of the ten key characteristics. For example, the specific mechanism
hypothesis might be that benzene induces certain chromosomal aberrations
that are characteristic of carcinogens. This leads to review questions that help
to identify evidence relevant to this specific mechanism hypothesis. In this
case, there is mechanistic evidence that exposure to benzene causes chromo-
somal aberrations in vivo in bone marrow cells of mice and rats. There is also
mechanistic evidence that benzene exposure also causes chromosomal aberra-
tions and mutation in human cells in vitro. This mechanistic evidence should
be listed alongside the specific mechanism hypothesis and will adjudicate on
the contentious features of the proposed mechanism. The identified evidence
may be sufficient to determine the status of the general mechanistic claim, but
this would involve first evaluating the evidence of mechanisms, which is the
topic of Chap. 6.
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5.6 Worked Example on Probiotics and Dental Caries
Thisworked example shows howour generalmethod for gathering evidence ofmech-
anisms can be applied to a specific case dealing with the effectiveness of probiotics
for dental caries.
Identify specific mechanism hypotheses for probiotics in preventing dental
caries. Cagetti et al. (2013) conducted a review of the caries-prevention effect of
probiotics in human. Three studies were found assessing caries lesion development
as outcome, with a further 20 studies reporting only caries risk factors as interim
outcomes. The authors concluded “…[t]he effect of probiotics on the development
of caries lesion seems encouraging, but to date, RCTs on this topic are insufficient
to provide scientific clinical evidence.”
More recently, a systematic reviewon probiotics and oral health (Seminario-Amez
et al. 2017) reached similar conclusions on the effectiveness for the prevention of
dental caries; laboratory data and the effect on interim outcomes is promising, but
long-term clinical trials are needed.





• production of organic acids
• bacteriocin-like compounds
• immune-modulation (Teughels et al. 2008)
Cagetti et al. (2013) did note that not all of these mechanisms were fully under-
stood. Seminario-Amez et al. (2017) also noted that the mechanism of probiotics
in the oral cavity is not clearly established. However, studies are cited to support
the role of probiotics in reducing counts of cariogenic pathogens, inhibiting peri-
odontal pathogens, modulating the inflammatory response and producing beneficial
substances. The ability of probiotics to compete with pathogens for adhesion sur-
faces and nutrients, causing displacement of the latter ones, was also confirmed in
laboratory studies.
Formulate the review questions and search the literature. In order to further
explore how probiotics might work for the prevention of dental caries, we searched
for review articles describing the mechanism of action. Four relevant articles were
found (Bonifait et al. 2009; Caglar et al. 2005; Saha et al. 2012; Singh et al. 2013).
Refine results of the search. Bonifait et al. (2009) postulated that “[t]o have a
beneficial effect in limiting or preventing dental caries, a probiotic must be able to
adhere to dental surfaces and integrate into the bacterial communities making up
the dental biofilm. It must also compete with and antagonize the cariogenic bacteria
and thus prevent their proliferation. Finally, metabolism of food-grade sugars by the
probiotic should result in low acid production.” Bonifait et al. (2009) cite a number of
74 5 Gathering Evidence of Mechanisms
studies showing the different abilities of the probiotics, such as the ability to integrate
with the biofilm, and conclude that probiotics can neutralize acidic conditions in the
mouth and interfere with cariogenic bacteria. The same evidence is cited in Singh
et al. (2013).
Present the evidence ofmechanisms. The number of studies investigating the effec-
tiveness of probiotics for the prevention of dental caries is limited. There is a body
of evidence from laboratory studies and clinical trials that interim outcomes linked
with reduced dental caries can be improved through the use of probiotics. Several
specific mechanism hypotheses were found in this research, mainly dealing with
local (rather than systemic) effects of probiotics. However, not all mechanisms are
yet fully understood.
In this example, understanding how probiotics might work through the various
mechanisms of action helps to interpret the limited evidence of effectiveness. Probi-
otics are likely to have a preventive effect on dental caries, effected through a range
of known mechanisms. Probiotics are also very unlikely to have significant adverse
effects (Borriello et al. 2003).
We did not undertake a systematic review of the evidence on how probiotics might
work. However, there appears to be a consistent view of the underlying mechanisms
between the publications reviewed here. In this case, where unintended consequences
are likely to beminimal due to the alreadywide and safe use of probiotics, a systematic
review may not be needed to generate evidence of mechanisms.
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Chapter 6
Evaluating Evidence of Mechanisms
Abstract In this chapter, we discuss how to evaluate evidence of mechanisms. This
begins with an account of how a mechanistic study provides evidence for features
of specific mechanism hypotheses, laying out a three step procedure of evaluating:
(1) the methods used, (2) the implementation of the methods, and (3), the stability
of the results. The next step is to combine those evaluations to present the quality of
evidence of the general mechanistic claim.
Having explained how evidence of mechanisms can be obtained, the next step is to
evaluate that evidence, which is the topic of this chapter. In the following chapter
will explain how this evaluation can be integrated with an evaluation of evidence
for a correlation in order to determine an overall evaluation of the causal claim of
interest.
6.1 Overview
Evaluating evidence of mechanisms should start with clear formulations of the
general mechanistic claim and each specific mechanism hypothesis, for which evi-
dence is gathered via the procedure described in Chap.5. The general mechanistic
claim concerns either the existence of a mechanism (to account for efficacy) or the
similarity of mechanisms between populations (to account for external validity).
The specific mechanism hypotheses posit key features of potential mechanisms of
action; corroborating evidence for the specific mechanism hypotheses thus supports
the general mechanism claim.
Evaluating evidence of mechanisms requires assessing the reliability of the meth-
ods and techniques by which the evidence was produced. For a general mechanistic
claim about the existence of a mechanism, this evidence may come from clinical
studies that report a strong correlation between variables. Clinical study evidence
should be evaluated according to normal criteria of good experimental design and
analysis—see, e.g., Chow and Liu (2004). However, a mere correlation, even a strong
one, may result from unmeasured confounding factors. Thus, only when clinical
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study evidence is high quality can it significantly support a claim about the existence
of a mechanism. Similarly, observing a clear dose-response relationship between
variables can lend credibility to a causal interpretation (Hill 1965), and thus to the
existence of a linking mechanism. Note, however, that biological mechanisms often
exhibit feedback regulation and other complex behaviours that do not give rise to
clear dose-response relationships. The lack of a dose-response relationship is thus
not strong evidence against the existence of a mechanism. For establishing similar-
ity of mechanisms, one normally needs some evidence of the details of the specific
features of the relevant mechanisms.
A mechanistic study provides evidence for features of specific mechanism
hypotheses. Mechanistic studies are conducted by one or more of the following
three means:
1. Experimental manipulation: by finding a suitable experimental system in which
the mechanism or parts of it are present, making predictions about the mecha-
nism’s behaviour under interventions on some of its parts, and comparing the
predictions to the outcomes of experiments where those parts are actuallymanip-
ulated. Standard tools for evaluating the quality of experimental design, data
analysis, randomisation procedure (when applicable) and statistical inference
can thus be applied to evaluate the possibility of experimental error (Mont-
gomery 2009). Simulation experiments can also be used, especially to investigate
whether the hypothesised organisation of a mechanism is in fact sufficient for
producing the phenomenon of interest. However, the modelling assumptions on
which a simulation is based should be corroborated by empirical evidence before
the results of a simulation can be considered as evidence for causal claims.
2. Observation: entities, activities and organisation of a mechanism can be found
by observation techniques such as imaging technologies, autopsy, (molecular)
epidemiological studies, and social surveys (for mechanisms that include parts
of the social environment as components, or which are sensitive to sociological
variables like socioeconomic status, parental or neighbourhood effects).
3. Analogy: Sometimes a mechanism can be hypothesised, and, to a low degree,
even confirmed, by analogy to an establishedmechanism linking a closely similar
intervention/exposure to a similar outcome.
The particular challenges for evaluating evidence for features ofmechanisms stem
from the fact that the evidence is often produced in systems in which most of the
natural context of the mechanism is absent (e.g., in vitro studies), or in which the
context and possibly the mechanism itself is different from humans (e.g., model
organism studies). Model organism studies are susceptible to bias in the same way as
human trials. Standard ways of evaluating statistical errors or bias due to trial design
may be used to assess the quality of trials conducted on experimental animals (Chow
and Liu 2004). In the case of in vitro studies that require extensive preparation of
samples and employ complicated and indirect detection methods, there is always
the risk that an experimental result is an artefact produced by the instruments or
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preparation methods, rather than a feature belonging to the actual mechanism. In
addition to evaluating the possibility of mere experimental error and bias, weighing
evidence of mechanisms requires evaluating how well these problems have been
mitigated in the process of creating the evidence.
Below we describe a procedure for evaluating evidence frommechanistic studies,
broken down to three steps:
1. Evaluating the methods used,
2. Evaluating the implementation of the methods, and
3. Evaluating the stability of the results.
Each step involves evaluating the mechanistic studies by means of particular quality
indicators. Evidence that ranks well (respectively, badly) in the light of several indi-
cators ought to be taken as higher (respectively, lower) quality than evidence that
ranks well (respectively, badly) with respect to fewer considerations. Note that this
is not a rigidly algorithmic approach. Instead, domain-specific expertise should be
employed in interpreting results and must be allowed to adjust the overall quality
ranking. There are also trade-offs between the quality indicators; these are pointed
out below. Finally, in cases where one has evidence that supports the general mech-
anistic claim directly, e.g. a high quality clinical trial, as well as evidence in support
of some specific mechanism hypotheses (see Fig. 3.1), one needs to combine these
to come up with a final quality status for the general mechanistic claim.
The procedure of this section is summarised in Fig. 6.1. The three-step method
for evaluating mechanistic studies is presented in the next section, Sect. 6.2. These
steps contribute to the evaluation of the general mechanistic claim as described in

















Fig. 6.1 A procedure for evaluating evidence of mechanisms
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6.2 Evaluating Mechanistic Studies
This section further develops the three-step procedure outlined above.
Step 1. Evaluate methods. The first step is to evaluate the methods employed by the
studies under review. Methods should be evaluated with respect to their typical error
characteristics. This requires an amount of domain specific expert knowledge, but
typically there are someparadigmatic examples ofwell conducted studies and reliable
methods that can serve as a benchmark for evaluating the reliability of methods.
A precondition for evaluating methods is that the methods themselves and their
error characteristics are understood. This gives us three general quality indicators,
described below.
1. Well understood methods and model systems. In order to evaluate mechanistic
studies as high quality, it is normally essential to establish that the methods
by which the evidence was produced are reliable. The better one understands
how a method works, the easier it is to evaluate its reliability. Understanding
how a method works is thus normally a precondition for attributing high quality
to an item of evidence produced by that method. This applies to experimental
model systems as well. Evidence produced in well understood model systems,
in which the mechanisms responsible for the experimental result can be directly
compared to relevant mechanisms in humans, should be given higher credence
than evidence produced in model systems whose functioning is poorly under-
stood. This indicator trades off against indicator (2) below: well characterised
and understood experimental systems are typically simple, and thus often fail to
faithfully reflect the whole-organism level physiology of humans.
2. The degree to which experimental systems replicate human features of interest,
and the quality of experimental animal trials.Model systems that faithfully repli-
cate human features of interest have greater external validity than ones that are
very dissimilar to humans. The greater the similarity between an experimental
model system and humans, the higher the quality of the evidence gleaned from
the model. Notice a trade off between the choice of a model by its similarity
to humans, and the tractability of the model itself. The most well understood
experimental models are typically highly dissimilar to humans, whereas mod-
els that faithfully replicate many features of humans are considerably less well
understood on the whole. Models that are very well characterised, but highly
dissimilar to humans, are often used in basic science research that aims to dis-
cover highly general mechanisms potentially shared across many species, and
such models are indispensable for this purpose. However, when the main focus
of research is on justifying claims about causality in humans, the similarity of
model systems to humans is an important consideration to keep in mind in eval-
uating evidence obtained in diverse experimental systems. This indicator trades
off against indicator (1), as explained above. Studies performed on experimental
animals may offer more conclusive evidence of the operation of an underlying
mechanism, as more invasive intervention and measurement methods may be
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used in experimental animals than in humans. Animal trials are susceptible to
bias in the same way as human studies, and should be evaluated similarly.
3. The appropriateness of surrogate endpoints. In some cases, it is not straightfor-
ward to directly measure an outcome of interest. However, it may be possible to
measure some distinct endpoint as a way of indirectly measuring the endpoint of
interest. Such a distinct endpoint is sometimes called a surrogate endpoint. For
example, blood pressure may be used as a surrogate endpoint for left ventricular
function, since it is more straightforward to directly measure blood pressure than
left ventricular function, say, by echocardiography (Aronson 2005). Crucially,
an endpoint is more likely to be an informative surrogate for the endpoint of
interest if it features in the mechanism productive of that endpoint of interest.
For example, there is a mechanism linking elevated cholesterol to an increase in
the risk of heart disease, and so cholesterol levels are often used as a surrogate
endpoint for risk of heart disease. As a result, evaluating evidence ofmechanisms
is important for the validation of surrogate endpoints (AHRQ 2013). Indeed, in
some cases overlooking mechanistic evidence has led to an inappropriate choice
of surrogate endpoints and harmful consequences, for example, the recommen-
dation of anti-arrhythmic drugs on the basis of employing ventricular ectopic
beat as a surrogate endpoint for cardiac mortality (Holman 2017).
Step 2. Evaluate implementation. The second step is to evaluate how well the indi-
vidual studies have implemented the methods used. Different methods have their
typical error characteristics. For instance, trials may produce biased results if ran-
domisation is not implemented appropriately, or imaging technologies may pro-
duce artefacts. Assessing the implementation of methods consists in evaluating what
means have been taken to control for the characteristic errors of the study methods.
Doing this requires some knowledge of the typical error characteristics of different
methods. One should thus consider the quality indicator (1) first: if the principles
of operation of a particular method are poorly understood, it is more likely that one
fails to distinguish and control for experimental artefacts and biased results. After
that, one should assess whether the methods were implemented with appropriate
precautions to control for known error types. It is typically impossible to ensure that
all possible sources of error have been controlled for in implementing a particular
method.
Step 3. Evaluate results. The third step is to evaluate the stability of the results.
High credence in the validity of a result can be conferred by finding that several
independent methods provide similar results. This is an important indicator of the
reliability of a result:
4. Independent detectability. The greater the number of independent methods that
are able to confirm features of a mechanism, the more confident one can be that
the observations are real and not artefacts.
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However, one should also assess whether results are consistent across studies
conducted in similar settings using similar methods. This gives us a further quality
indicator:
5. Consistency. Inconsistencies that cannot be explained as resulting from differ-
ences in methods or relevant contextual factors, or as resulting from poor imple-
mentation ofmethods in some of the studies, should result in lowering the quality
status of the evidence.
Finally, one should assess how tolerant the confirmedmechanisms are to variation
in background conditions or properties of the parts of the mechanism itself. Mecha-
nisms that are highly robust in the sense that their operation is not disturbed by such
variation are more likely to be extrapolatable between heterogeneous contexts than
mechanisms that are sensitive to such variation.
6. Robustness of features across varying contexts. The greater the variability of con-
texts or model systems in which some or all features of a mechanism are found,
the more plausible it is that the results are extrapolatable. This may be under-
stood as application of Hill’s consistency indicator to evidence of mechanisms
(Hill 1965).
6.3 Determining the Status of the General Mechanistic
Claim
This section describes how the status of the generalmechanism claim can be assessed,
based on the evaluation of the mechanistic study evidence for the specific mecha-
nism hypotheses and the evaluation of the clinical study evidence for the general
mechanistic claim.
Recall that different types of general mechanistic claim need to be considered for
the purpose of evaluating efficacy and for the purpose of evaluating external validity.
In the former case, one considers the question of whether there is a mechanism
capable of accounting for the observed correlation. In the latter case, one considers
the similarity of mechanisms between the study and the target populations. The two
boxes below describe typical conditions in which one would attribute a high (or low)
status to either type of general mechanistic claim. As evidence of mechanisms can be
highly heterogeneous, these conditions should not be thought of as exhaustive, nor as
giving a mechanical procedure for attributing status. Instead, they are to be thought
of as heuristics that need to be considered in the light of relevant domain-specific
expertise, to arrive at a decision about the status of the general mechanistic claim
(see also the tools in Chap.4).
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Checklist of questions to consider in evaluating a general mechanistic
claim for efficacy
Does the evidence warrant conferring a higher status to a mechanistic existence
claim? Consider the following questions about the evidence; can one or more
be answered in the affirmative?
1. Has a correlation of the same size been established in many studies under
slightly varying circumstances (robust detectability)? If yes, is it likely that
the population of interest falls within the range of circumstances which have
been tested?
2. Is the observed correlation so large that it is very unlikely to be explained
by bias or confounding, leaving the existence of a mediating mechanism as
the most plausible explanation?
3. Is the mechanism known in some detail? Can it account for the correlation
and its size? Are most of the crucial features of the mechanism known and
understood? Does the mechanism support novel predictions?
4. Is it plausible that the behaviour of the mechanism crucially depends on
just some components or organisational features? If so, are such critical
features well established according to the considerations described above?
This can provide sufficient grounds for assigning the mechanistic claim a
higher status than itwould otherwise have. Example: consider a biochemical
pathwaywith a single rate-limiting step. In such a case, establishing the rate-
limiting step is usually more important for understanding the behaviour of
the wholemechanism than establishing the rate of the reactions downstream
from that step.
Does the evidence warrant conferring a lower status to a mechanistic existence
claim? Consider the following questions about the evidence; can one or more
be answered in the affirmative?
1. Is a counteracting mechanism likely? If so, could the correlation the mech-
anism is posited to explain be spurious? (If the existence of a mechanism
is inferred from clinical studies, discovering that the observed correlation
might be spurious counts as evidence against existence of the purported
underlying mechanism as well.) If the evidence does not suggest that the
correlation is spurious, this does not mean that one should revise the con-
clusion about the existence of a mechanism. Rather, evidence of masking
suggests that the (masked) mechanism will not reliably support efficacious
interventions unless the masking mechanisms can be controlled for.
2. Does the mechanism exhibit such complexity that its overall behaviour is
very unpredictable?
3. Is the hypothesised mechanism inferred from evidence of an analogous
mechanism or mechanisms in some other domain?
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Checklist of questions to consider in evaluating a general mechanistic
claim for external validity
Does the evidence warrant conferring a higher status to amechanistic similarity
claim? Consider the following questions about the evidence; can one or more
be answered in the affirmative?
1. Has a correlation of the same size been established in several studies under
slightly varying circumstances (robust detectability), and in several popu-
lations that are related to the target population (e.g., phylogenetically, geo-
graphically), in such a way that these correlations cannot be explained by
bias or confounding, and one must posit a similar mechanism operating in
all the populations to explain the observed correlations?
2. Is the mechanism known in some detail both in the study population and
the target population, and found to be similar in both, and such that it can
account for the observed correlation? This can be established by applying
the considerations described above.
3. When the behaviour of the whole mechanism crucially depends on some
component(s) or an organisational feature, are the critical features of the
mechanism similar in the study and the target populations? If so, this can
provide sufficient grounds for assigning the mechanistic claim a higher
status than it would otherwise have.
Does the evidence warrant conferring a lower status to a mechanistic similarity
claim? Consider the following questions about the evidence; can one or more
be answered in the affirmative?
1. Is a counteracting mechanism in the target population likely? Does this
suggest that the correlation that the mechanism is posited to explain is spu-
rious? If not, this does not mean that one should revise the conclusion about
the existence of a mechanism. Rather, evidence of masking suggests that
the (masked) mechanism will not reliably support efficacious interventions
unless the masking mechanisms can be controlled for.
2. Is there dissimilarity between the mechanisms in the study and the target
populations?
3. Does the mechanism proposed to support external validity exhibit such
complexity that its overall behaviour is unpredictable?
4. Are the hypothesised mechanisms inferred from evidence of an analogous
mechanism or mechanisms in some other domain?
Mechanistic evidence for efficacy or external validity should be evaluated con-
sidering the correlational evidence that it is invoked to explain. There may be cases
in which one has good evidence of mechanisms from analytical studies—e.g., from
bench research on experimental systems—that could be invoked to explain a par-
ticular correlation, but the correlation in question is not itself well established. This
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Table 6.1 Determining the status of the general mechanistic claim (GMC) on the basis of evidence
from mechanistic studies and from clinical studies
Status of the GMC on the basis of mechanistic studies
Established Provisionally
established
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established
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ruled out
Ruled out











Ruled out Ruled out
Ruled out Speculative Arguably false Ruled out Ruled out Ruled out Ruled out Ruled out
suggests that there could be hitherto unidentified masking mechanisms that inter-
fere with the operation of the mechanism of interest, or that the mechanism might
exhibit stochastic behaviour that does notmanifest as an easily detectable correlation.
Such considerations should be taken into account in assessing the status of a gen-
eral mechanistic claim. In evaluating a general mechanistic claim, evidence arising
from clinical studies and evidence arising from mechanistic studies have mutually
supporting roles.
Table6.1 determines the status of the general mechanistic claim given the sta-
tus of the general mechanistic claim based on only clinical studies and its status
based on only mechanistic studies. This highlights the mutually supporting roles of
mechanistic studies and clinical studies. Note, finally, that determining the status of
the general mechanistic claim by combining evidence from clinical and mechanistic
studies should not be confused with the task of determining the status of the causal
claim on the basis of the status of the general mechanistic claim and the status of the
correlational claim—a point which is discussed further at the end of Sect. 7.1 when
we develop the analogy of reinforced concrete.
6.4 Presenting the Quality of Evidence of Mechanisms
Preparing and presenting summaries of the quality of mechanistic evidence in a stan-
dardised manner can be challenging, as evidence of mechanisms comes from highly
heterogeneous sources andmay involve amixture of quantitative and qualitative rela-
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tionships. Some general guidance can nonetheless be given. The following questions
need to be addressed when presenting the status of the general mechanistic claim.
Presenting the status of the general mechanistic claim for efficacy. The
following questions should be addressed:
1. What is the intervention or exposure level?
2. What is the outcome and how is it measured?
3. What is the status of the general mechanistic claim? Questions to be consid-
ered here are, for instance (see Sects. 6.2 and 6.3): Does the clinical study
evidence make the general mechanistic claim plausible? What are the spe-
cific mechanism hypotheses? Are there any serious gaps in the evidence
for these claims? Are there any serious inconsistencies in the evidence for
these claims? Is there any serious indirectness (see Sect. 4.6)? Is counter-
acting plausible?
Presenting the status of the general mechanistic claim for external validity.
The following questions should be addressed:
1. What is the target population?
2. What is the study population?
3. What is the intervention or exposure level in the target?
4. What is the outcome and how is it measured in the target?
5. What is the intervention or exposure level in the study?
6. What is the outcome and how is it measured in the study?
7. What is the status of the general mechanistic claim concerning similarity?
Questions to be considered here are, for instance (see Sects. 6.2 and 6.3):
What is the hypothesised mechanism in the study population? Are there any
serious gaps in the evidence? Are there any serious inconsistencies in the
evidence? Is there any serious indirectness? Is counteracting plausible? Is
there any phylogenetic evidence? Is the evidence robust?
When presenting the status of a specific mechanism hypothesis, the quality of
the overall evidence of a mechanism should be presented in such a way that it also
outlines the quality of the evidence for each of the individual component features of
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the mechanism, evaluated by employing the considerations for evaluating evidence
described in Sect. 6.2. For example, suppose that a drug is hypothesised to work by
binding to a particular receptor on a particular type of cell. The quality of the evidence
for this interactionwithin the overall mechanism should be evaluated by assessing the
studies providing evidence for the structure of both the drug and the receptor type, as
well as any direct evidence estimating the binding affinity of the drug to its intended
target. The greater the number of independent studies, employing well-established
experimentalmethods that are able to confirm the hypothesised interaction, the higher
the quality of evidence for this particular feature of the hypothesised mechanism.
Conversely, if the evidence for particular features of a mechanism is inconsistent, or
gleaned from few studies known to be susceptible to bias, the quality of evidence for
those features of the mechanism should be considered low.
To indicate the status of particular features of the mechanism, and the general







Provisionally ruled out - -
Ruled out #
A brief verbal explanation can be included, e.g. ++; inconsistencies. These sym-
bols can be added to a diagram of a specific mechanism hypothesis, in order to
represent the status of key features of the mechanism.
For a critical appraisal tool for mechanistic evidence which summarises key
aspects of the evidence gathering process described in Chap. 5, and the evaluation
process outlined in this section, see Sect. 4.5.
This systemof evaluating and summarizing evidence is notmeant as a replacement
for other well established evidence assessment frameworks such as GRADE. Rather,
the considerations outlined here can often be integrated to existing approaches. For
an example of how some of these considerationsmay be incorporated into the popular
GRADE system by a simple amendment of the GRADE evidence profile tables, see
Sect. 4.6. Our other tools in Chap. 4 also demonstrate how the evaluation of evidence
of mechanisms can be integrated into existing evidence appraisal practices.
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Example: ACE inhibitors.
ACE inhibitors work by modulating the functioning of the renin-angiotensin
system (RAS), which is involved in regulation of the sodium concentration of
blood, and arterial blood pressure. The basic architecture of RAS regarding
blood pressure regulation has been corroborated by numerous studies employ-
ing varying methods—see, e.g., Fyhrquist and Saijonmaa (2008) for a review.
Thus, there are no particularly contentious parts that would necessitate an in-
depth evaluation of the evidence, earning the specific mechanism hypothesis
a status of established (indicated by *). This suffices to establish the gen-
eral mechanistic claim in support of efficacy in those populations in which
trial evidence shows a correlation between ACE inhibitor treatment and blood
pressure lowering. To establish the external validity of the blood pressure low-
ering effect of ACE inhibitors, one needs to establish the general mechanistic
claim stating that the RAS mechanisms in the study and the target populations
are similar enough.
However, evidence from two subgroup analyses of the ALLHAT (Antihy-
pertensive and Lipid-Lowering Treatment to Prevent Heart Attack Trial) trial
suggested that therewere difficulties in establishing efficacy forACE inhibitors
inAfricanCaribbean populations. Piller et al. (2006) showedmuch higher rates
of angioedema (an important and serious side-effect of ACE inhibitor treat-
ment) inAfricanCaribbean individuals, while Leenen et al. (2006) showed that
calcium channel blockers (CCB) showed better efficacy than ACEi in that pop-
ulation. The key component of the mechanism regarding the efficacy of ACE
inhibitors in African Caribbean populations is renin—an enzyme involved in
the production of angiotensinogen, which is further converted by ACE into
angiotensin I, and angiotensin II, a highly potent vasoconstrictor. Inhibiting
ACE leads to downregulation of angiotensin II, thus inhibiting the RASmech-
anism from increasing blood pressure. Low level of renin activity makes the
ACE inhibitorsmuch less effective asmeans to control RAS functioning. There
is high quality mechanistic evidence that the African Caribbean population is
characterised by low renin profile (Khan and Beevers 2005). There is thus high
quality evidence that the mechanisms in white and African Caribbean popu-
lations differ at a crucial point. Thus, the general mechanistic claim that the
mechanisms between these two populations are similar is ruled out (indicated
by #). This is why instead calcium channel blockers are the recommended anti-
hypertensive treatment in African Caribbean populations (Clarke and Russo
2016).
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Example: Evaluating dose-response relationships.
A particular challenge in evaluating the effects of a pharmacological interven-
tion, or effects of an exposure to a chemical agent considers dose-response
behaviour. Typically, dose-response is not linear, as metabolic pathways will
eventually saturate as the dose increases. It may also be the case that the rate
of metabolism and types of metabolites produced vary at specific doses. Nor-
mally, one does not have experimental or other data on dose-response at every
level of clinical or public health interest. Rather, effects of very low or high
doses must be inferred relying on models fitted to whatever data are available.
This creates an extrapolation problem—how to establish that the projected
responses are accurate, i.e., that the extrapolation from observed data points
is reliable. Hypotheses about mechanisms often need to be considered here.
For instance, assuming that dose-response is linear, and inferring hypothetical
low (respectively, high) dose responses from this assumption implies that the
same mechanisms, operating in the same way, are responsible for the response
at all or most dose ranges. If, in contrast, measured or estimated responses
suggest dose-specific effects (in the form of non-linear dose-response curve),
this implies competition between dissimilar metabolic mechanisms.
An example of such an extrapolation problem comes from research on ben-
zene. Recent evidence suggests that benzene is metabolised more rapidly at
low exposures, and that low-exposure metabolism favours more hazardous
metabolites (Thomas et al. 2014). If true, this implies that different mecha-
nisms operate at low exposures than higher ones. These mechanisms should
be such that they are highly sensitive to benzene—i.e., involve a high-affinity
enzyme—but are quickly saturated, wherein metabolism switches to other
mechanisms as the exposure increases (Rappaport et al. 2009). Estimating
very low exposure levels and measuring the response can be methodologi-
cally challenging, forcing researchers to engage in extrapolations described
above. Mechanistic evidence thus becomes crucial—more direct evidence of
the features of enzymatic components of a metabolic mechanism that has high
affinity, but gets quickly saturated, is called for. As of now, the question of
low-exposure effects of benzene remains open to debate.
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Chapter 7
Using Evidence of Mechanisms
to Evaluate Efficacy and External
Validity
Abstract Previous chapters in Part III develop accounts of how to gather and evalu-
ate evidence of claims about mechanisms. This chapter explains how this evaluation
can be combined with an evaluation of evidence for relevant correlations in order to
produce an overall evaluation of a causal claim. The procedure is broken down to
address efficacy, external validity, and then the overall presentation of the claim.
In this chapter, we move from claims about mechanisms to causal claims, i.e., claims
of efficacy and external validity. As we have seen in Chap. 6, in order to establish
efficacy, one needs to establish both the claim that there is a correlation between
putative effect and putative cause and the claim that there is a mechanism connecting
the putative effect and cause that can account for the size of the observed correlation.
Sect. 7.1 explains how these two types of evidence can be combined to evaluate the
status of an efficacy claim. For purposes of clinical or public health decision making
one often wants to make inferences about effectiveness, i.e., about causality in target
populations other than the study population. Besides evidence directly about the
target population, evidence of mechanistic similarity between the target populations
and study populations for which efficacy has already been evaluated may be relevant
to the status of the causal claim in the target population. We deal with this question
of external validity in Sect. 7.2.
7.1 Efficacy
Here we address the question of how to combine evaluations of a general mechanistic
claim and a correlation claim in order to evaluate a claim of effectiveness.
General mechanistic claim. We have seen (in Chap. 6) that the status of the claim
that there is a mechanism connecting putative cause and effect is assessed along two
different dimensions:
1. Is clinical study evidence strong enough to make it plausible that there is a
mechanism that can account for the size of the correlation?
2. Is there a specific mechanism hypothesis and is the existence of the crucial
features of that mechanism hypothesis established?
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Correlation claim. The correlation claim is the claim that there is a correlation
between the putative cause and effect, conditional on plausible confounders. Note
that mechanistic evidence and results from previous clinical studies may rule in
some variables as plausible confounders.Mechanistic evidencemay also speak to the
question whether a certain clinical study is well-conducted and properly controlled
for these confounding variables. Given that one has settled on both a set of potential
confounders and an assessment of the quality of the design of the relevant studies,
deciding whether the putative cause and effect are correlated is a purely statistical
question. A meta-analysis, for instance, of relevant studies yields an estimate for the
size of the correlation and corresponding confidence interval and p-value. The status
of the correlation claim then depends on the width of the confidence interval, the size
of the p-value, and the heterogeneity of the studies evaluated. A low p-value may,
for instance, lead to a high status of the correlation claim.
Efficacy claim. To obtain the status of an efficacy claim, we combine the status of
the corresponding general mechanistic claim with the status of the corresponding
correlation claim. Efficacy is established just when it is established that there is a
correlation and that there is some mechanism which can account for this correlation
(Russo andWilliamson 2007; Illari 2011; Clarke et al. 2013, 2014). More generally,
the status of the causal claim can be taken to be the minimum of two statuses: the
status of the correlation claim and the status of the general mechanistic claim:
Status of an efficacy claim. The status of the claim A is a cause of B is the
minimum of:
1. the status of the claim that A and B are appropriately correlated, and
2. the status of the claim that there is an appropriate mechanism linking A and
B that can account for this correlation.
Hence, a causal claim cannot have a higher status than both the correlation claim
and the general mechanistic claim (see discussions in (Russo and Williamson 2007,
2011, 2012; Russo 2011; Clarke and Russo 2016, 2017)). To give an example,
efficacy is provisionally established if the existence of a correlation is established or
provisionally established and the existence of a mechanism that can account for the
correlation is provisionally established. Equally, efficacy is provisionally ruled out
if a correlation is provisionally ruled out and if the existence of a mechanism that
can account for the correlation is provisionally ruled out or of higher status.
Before turning to external validity, we discuss a potential source of confusion:
Digression: reinforced concrete. In the framework set out above, there are two sepa-
rate distinctions in play. First, there is the distinction between evidence of correlation
and evidence of mechanisms (Illari 2011). This distinction is core to the approach
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taken in this handbook: the claim that A is a cause of B is evaluated according to how
strongly evidence of correlation supports the claim that A and B are appropriately
correlated, and how strongly evidence ofmechanisms supports the generalmechanis-
tic claim that there is a mechanism linking A to B that can account for the correlation.
Second, there is a distinction between clinical studies (which repeatedly measure A
and B together) and mechanistic studies (which investigate the details of a putative
mechanism linking A and B). It is important to note that these two distinctions do
not align. Both clinical and mechanistic studies can provide evidence of correlation
(though clinical studies often provide better evidence of correlation than mechanis-
tic studies). Similarly, both clinical and mechanistic studies can provide evidence of
mechanisms (although mechanistic studies often provide better evidence). See Fig.
3.1. Moreover, there are situations in which a causal claim can be established on the
basis of clinical studies alone, as explained in Sect. 2.3 and Chap.6.
Clinical studies and mechanistic studies can be mutually reinforcing. Consider an
analogy to reinforced concrete, which is formed by placing steel grids into concrete
(Clarke et al. 2014). Concrete has high resistance to compressive stresses but fractures
under tension. Steel, however, has high strength in tension. So, if steel is placed in
concrete to produce reinforced concrete, we get a composite material where the
concrete resists the compression and the steel resists the tension. The combination
of two different materials produces a material that is much stronger than either
of its components. In the same way, combining clinical studies with mechanistic
studies produces much stronger overall evidence of efficacy than would either type
of evidence on its own, because they compensate for each other’s weaknesses. For
instance, clinical studies can rule out masking: masking occurs when one or more
counteracting mechanisms cancel out the effect of the mechanism of action. On the
other hand, mechanistic studies can rule out confounding.
The following scenarios illustrate the idea of reinforced concrete.
Scenario 1. Suppose, for instance, that many well conducted RCTs consistently
show a correlation between the putative cause and effect and that bench research
provides only very low quality evidence for the general mechanistic claim that there
exists a mechanism that can account for the size of the correlation. In this case, it
might seem that the correlation is established and the existence of the mechanism is
speculative. In which case, efficacy is only speculative. However, this misrepresents
the evidence for the general mechanistic claim. It confuses evidence obtained only
by bench research with total evidence of mechanisms from all sources. Recall from
Sect. 6.3 that clinical studies may also yield evidence relevant to the general mecha-
nistic claim that there exists a mechanism—see Joffe (2011) and Williamson (2018,
Sect. 2.1). In the above example, the RCTs, when combined with the bench research,
can yield a status for the general mechanistic claim that is higher than speculative—
an application of the reinforced concrete metaphor. Accordingly, the efficacy claim
will have a status higher than speculative.
Scenario 2. Suppose low quality clinical studies suggest that there is a correlation.
Suppose too that high quality mechanistic studies support key aspects of a specific
mechanism hypothesis, but that the possibility of a counteracting mechanism cannot
be ruled out. In this case, it is not clear that the proposed mechanism of action can
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account for the observed correlation, and the general mechanistic claim will not be
established. Subsequently, high quality clinical studies are carried out and determine
that the net correlation is indeed positive. These studies provide evidence that any
counteracting mechanism fails to totally mask the effect of the mechanism of action.
The total body of evidence may now suffice to establish the general mechanistic
claim (see Sect. 6.3). In this scenario, clinical studies reinforce mechanistic studies
when evaluating the general mechanistic claim.
Scenario 3. Suppose certain clinical studies provide low quality evidence of a
correlation. One might think that the key concern is confounding, so that when
there is high quality evidence of mechanisms that rules out confounding, efficacy
is established. However, confounding is not the only problem that arises with low
quality evidence of correlation. There is also the problem that the observed correlation
may not correspond to a correlation in the underlying data-generating probability
distribution. In order to establish efficacy, one needs to establish that there is a genuine
correlation in the underlying distribution. Hence, without high quality evidence of
correlation, efficacy cannot be established.
Scenario 4. Suppose that initially, certain clinical studies provide low quality evi-
dence of a correlation. Suppose that in this case, it is clear that the studies identify
a genuine correlation conditional on certain potential confounders, but that not all
plausible confounders have been controlled for. The key concern here, then, is con-
founding. For instance, there might be a large number of epidemiological studies all
showing a correlation between putative cause and effect, but where each study fails
to control for some particular variable which may be a confounding variable. Now,
if there is also high quality evidence of mechanisms that rules out this variable as
a confounder, efficacy is established. In this case, the mechanistic studies boost the
status of the correlation claim, to established. In this case, then, the overall status is
established.
7.2 External Validity
Whenmechanismswithin a studypopulation and the target population are sufficiently
similar, one can extrapolate an efficacy claim from the study population to the target
population. In this section, we show how to combine evidence of efficacy obtained
directly on the target population with evidence obtained by extrapolation from a
study population.
Three assessments feed into the evaluation of effectiveness:
1. Efficacy in the target population. Although studies performed directly on the
target population will normally be less conclusive than those performed on the
study population, they can form the basis of a preliminary evaluation of effi-
cacy in the target population. The preliminary status of the causal claim can be
determined as set out in Sect. 7.1.
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Table 7.1 Determining the status of the causal claim in the target population given the status of
the causal claim in the study population, the status of the claim that the mechanisms of action in
study and target are similar, and the status of the causal claim in the target population on the basis
only of studies carried out on the target population
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2. Efficacy in the study population. The status of efficacy in the study population
can also be determined by considering the procedure of Sect. 7.1.
3. Similarity of mechanisms in the study and target populations. The status of
the general mechanistic claim relevant to external validity (i.e., the claim that
the mechanisms of action are sufficiently similar in study and target) can be
determined as indicated in Sect. 6.3.
To obtain a final status for efficacy in the target, one can combine the preliminary
status in the target population with the status of efficacy in a study population,
provided that study and target population share similar mechanisms of action. The
status of the causal claim about the target population may be increased (respectively,
decreased) by observing that efficacy does (respectively, does not) hold in a study
population that is similar to the target population. In this case, causal claims are
extrapolated from the study population to the target population.
Table7.1 shows how the status of the causal claim in the target population can be
determined from the above three assessments. To change the preliminary status of
an efficacy claim given by studies directly on the target population, all evidence of
causation in the study population and of similarity of mechanisms needs to be of at
least moderate quality, and one or other needs to be high quality. Other quality levels
do not change the initial status.
Some remarks help to explain the table and relate it to other approaches that
address external validity.
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1. If studies on the target population would on their own establish causality in
the target population, this is strong, but not infallible, evidence for causation in
the target. If there is a study population for which similarity to the target has
been established but causation has been ruled out in the study population, then
causation in the target population is downgraded to provisionally established.
(Note that this situation is not covered by the protocol for evaluating external
validity advocated by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC);
see Sect. 8.1 for further discussion of this point.)
2. Changing the preliminary status of a causal claim obtained from evidence gath-
ered on the target population is more common when that evidence is of lower
quality. For instance, a provisionally established status may be changed to estab-
lished only in case of established efficacy in the study and established similarity
between study and target. The status arguable, however, may be changed in case
of established efficacy in the study and provisionally established similarity.
3. The GRADEworking group also evaluates whether evidence from a study popu-
lation can be used to draw inferences about the target population. In particular, the
GRADE working group considers the case where no evidence directly obtained
on the target population is available:
In general, one should not rate down for population differences unless one has com-
pelling reason to think that the biology in the population of interest is so different from
that of the population tested that the magnitude of effect will differ substantially. Most
often, this will not be the case. [...] The above discussion refers to different human
populations, but sometimes the only evidence will be from animal studies, such as rats
or primates. In general, we would rate such evidence down two levels for indirectness
(Guyatt et al. 2011, pp. 1304–1305)
Hence, the GRADE working group takes similarity of mechanisms to be estab-
lished by default when study and target populations are both human populations.
This is problematic because it sets the standard of evidence required for extrapo-
lation too low. In the case of animal studies, one can interpret the default assump-
tion of the GRADE working group as being that the causal claim is arguable
solely on the basis of causation in animals having been established. Again this is
problematic. In our approach, in the absence of evidence of similarity of mech-
anisms, efficacy in the study population cannot be extrapolated to the target.
Hence, even if many high quality RCTs in animals establish efficacy in animals,
in the absence of evidence of similarity, nothing can be concluded about efficacy
in humans. There is thus a sense in which the approach presented here is more
cautious than the GRADE approach to external validity.
4. Causation can be established or ruled out even where no clinical studies on the
target are available. This is the case when causation has been established in
a study population for which it has been established that it is mechanistically
similar to the target population. (This case is captured by the fourth row of
Table7.1, where causation in the target is speculative.)
5. Note that, by similarity of mechanisms we mean that any mechanisms in the
target population which counteract this mechanism do not mask the effect of
the mechanism of action to such an extent that a net correlation in the target
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population could not be explained mechanistically (see Sect. 2.3). Consequently,
with a mechanism established and some counteracting mechanisms established
in the study, a small correlation may be good evidence for causation in the target
even if it is not the case that the whole mechanistic structure is similar. After all,
this counteracting mechanism would only make the existent correlation smaller
in the study than in the target.
7.3 Presenting the Status of a Causal Claim
In presenting the status of a causal claim the following questions need to be addressed,
and the status of the causal claim presented after the evaluation of evidence.
Presenting the status of the efficacy claim. The following questions should be
addressed:
1. What is the population to which the status applies?
2. What is the intervention or exposure level?
3. What is the outcome and how is it measured?
4. What is the status of the correlation claim? How is this status obtained?
5. What is the status of the general mechanistic claim? How is this status
obtained? (See Chap. 6.)
6. What is the status of the efficacy claim?
The following box considers the case where efficacy is extrapolated from one to
another population
Presenting the status of the effectiveness claim. The following questions
should be addressed:
1. What is the target population to which the status applies?
2. What is the intervention or exposure level in the target?
3. What is the outcome and how is it measured in the target?
4. What is the study population?
5. What is the intervention or exposure level in the study?
6. What is the outcome and how is it measured in the study?
7. What is the status in the study? How is this status obtained?
8. What is the status in the target obtained by evidence directly of the target?
How is this status obtained?
9. What is the status of the general mechanistic claim, i.e. that target and study
are similar? (See Chap. 6.)
10. What is the overall status of the effectiveness claim?
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Standard evidence appraisal systems can be extended to take these considerations
into account. For an example of how to incorporate certain aspects of this procedure
into a GRADE-style evidence profile, see Sect. 4.6.
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Abstract An important problem in causal inference in medicine involves estab-
lishing causal relationships between environmental exposures and negative health
outcomes. It is typically not possible to use RCTs to solve this problem, for eth-
ical reasons. The approach outlined in this book is compared to two other promi-
nent approaches: the procedures of the International Agency for Research on Cancer
(IARC), and SYRINA, a framework for detecting exposures that affect the endocrine
system.
An important problem in causal inference in medicine involves establishing causal
relationships between environmental exposures and negative health outcomes (Hill
1965). Experimental studies, e.g., randomized controlled trials, tend to provide rel-
atively strong evidence for causal claims. However, when assessing exposures it is
typically not possible to carry out such trials in human populations, because this
would involve unethically intervening to expose individuals to factors that are sus-
pected to have deleterious health effects. The only available epidemiological studies
are observational. As a result, it is difficult to obtain epidemiological data that are
sufficient to establish causality.
This problem occurs, for instance, when assessing whether an environmental
exposure is carcinogenic in humans. In such cases, different types of evidence are
required. For example, the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC)
attempts to determine whether particular exposures cause cancer in humans by look-
ing at a variety of different types of evidence, namely, epidemiological studies, studies
in experimental animals, and mechanistic and other relevant data (IARC 2015). The
problem also occurs in assessing whether an exposure is an endocrine disruptor. In
this context, Vandenberg et al. (2016) introduced SYRINA, a framework for the sys-
tematic review and integrated assessment of exposures. In this chapter, we compare
the approach to assessing exposures given in this book with these other promi-
nent approaches. First compare our approach to external validity to the approach
endorsed by IARC, with reference to the example of establishing carcinogenicity of
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benzo[a]pyrene—a compound that IARC recently evaluated and decided to upgrade
from probable human carcinogen to human carcinogen largely based on just the
mechanistic evidence and evidence from cancer bioassays. We then compare our
approach to SYRINA, a framework for detecting exposures that affect the endocrine
system (Sect. 8.2).
8.1 Comparison to IARC
Herewe compare our approach to external validity to that of the International Agency
for Research on Cancer (IARC). A note on terminology here. IARC use the term
generalizability, as well as external validity, and for the purpose of this discussion
we will regard them as synonymous. First, consider an example:
Example: Carcinogenicity of benzo[a]pyrene.
Benzo[a]pyrene is a polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon (PAH) that is formed
during incomplete combustion of organic material. Benzo[a]pyrene and other
PAHs are an important industrial pollutant in soil, water, air, and sediments.
They are also found in high concentrations in tobacco smoke, and in some phar-
maceutical products. Human exposure occurs mainly through industrial and
environmental exposure (IARC 2009). IARC has evaluated benzo[a]pyrene
in four monographs, and it is currently classified as Group 1, carcinogenic to
humans (IARC 2015).
In the most recent evaluation, epidemiological data were not available to
the IARC working group. The working group therefore made its decision
to classify benzo[a]pyrene as carcinogenic to humans based on mechanistic
evidence and evidence from experimental animals. This makes the case of
benzo[a]pyrene especially interesting for our purposes, as according to the
procedure outlined above in Sect. 7.2, the correlation between benzo[a]pyrene
and cancer required to establish the causal claim in humans would have to be
inferred from observed outcomes in the experimental animals together with
the mechanistic data.
On the approach of this book, first one formulates the causal claim under
scrutiny: here, ‘benzo[a]pyrene causes cancer in humans’. In the context of
IARC, this is to be taken as a qualitative claim—IARC identifies cancer haz-
ards, and the exact size of the effect by which exposure increases cancer risk
does not play a role in determining carcinogenicity. We should note though
that a qualitative understanding of effect size does play a role in determining
carcinogenicity. The IARC process is explicitly based on the causal indicators
set out by Hill (1965), as we discuss above.
Next, one should assess—according to a suitable framework—the evidence
for a correlation between the exposure and its effect, and articulate any hypo-
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theticalmechanisms thatwould account for the correlation.Note that IARCuse
their own framework for assessing correlations (IARC 2015). A GRADE-like
framework would be potentially useful in this context too—assuming that suit-
able modifications can be made to allow for differences in the understanding
of bias in evidence that are appropriate for this change in purpose.
The evidence for the relevant mechanisms should then be graded accord-
ing to the procedures described in Chap.6. In the latest IARC monograph on
benzo[a]pyrene, all the evidence of a correlation between the exposure and
cancer came from studies on experimental animals—no epidemiological data
were evaluated. The correlation between exposure and cancer in humans must
thus be inferred via extrapolation from corresponding data in the experimental
animals. This is based on assessing the evidence for correlation in the experi-
mental animals, and assessment of similarities of the underlying mechanisms.
The IARC monograph reports evidence of cancer outcomes upon exposure to
benzo[a]pyrene in experimental animals. This was judged to be of high qual-
ity, both in terms of the validity of the research within species of experimental
animals, and in terms of the additional corroboration gained by these results
being robust across eight species of experimental animals (IARC 2009, 112–
131). In addition, evidence is presented and evaluated for two main types of
mechanism by which benzo[a]pyrene causes DNA adducts to form at known
cancer hotspots: in one of these a metabolite of benzo[a]pyrene binding the
DNAmolecule, and the other an oxidized form of benzo[a]pyrene. In addition,
similar activity of benzo[a]pyrene is reported to be shown in in vitro studies
on human cell lines (IARC 2009, 131–137).
IARC considered there to be sufficient evidence for carcinogenicity in the
experimental animals, i.e., the causal claim about the experimental animalswas
established. IARC’s current practice is to make some evaluations about possi-
ble mechanisms of carcinogenesis using a set of key characteristics shown by
carcinogens (Smith et al. 2016). This is broadly compatible with the approach
of this book, as there is high quality evidence of both correlation and underly-
ing mechanisms in the experimental animals. This alone would not suffice to
transfer the same claim to humans (nor does the IARC approach consider this).
However, strong evidence of similar mechanisms operating in the experimen-
tal animals and humans, and the robustness of the experimental animal results
across many species, warrants a mechanism-based extrapolation of the causal
claim from the experimental animals to humans (Wilde and Parkkinen 2017).
This, together with the mechanistic evidence directly on humans, such as evi-
dence of formation of DNA adducts, is what, on the approach presented here,
warrants establishing a causal conclusion about humans. In mechanism-based
extrapolation, one compares the mechanisms responsible for an outcome in
the target—of which a conclusion about causality is to be made—and in the
study—about which direct evidence of causality is available—and looks for
differences that might lead to differences in the outcome of interest between
the study and the target. Here the outcome of interest is the development of
tumours or the appearance of various cancer biomarkers upon exposure to
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benzo[a]pyrene. A dependence between these outcomes and benzo[a]pyrene
has been robustly demonstrated in the experimental animals. The relevant
mechanisms are the pathways by which benzo[a]pyrene causes DNA adducts
that can trigger tumorigenesis, that would explain the dependence. For these,
there is evidence from cultured human cell lines, as well as the experimental
animals, demonstrating strong similarities, and no differences that would indi-
cate that benzo[a]pyrene does not cause cancer in humans. In addition, there
is concordant evidence of the outcomes in several species of experimental
animal, lending further credibility to the assumption that the carcinogenicity
of benzo[a]pyrene is not dependent on idiosyncratic features of any particular
species. These considerations, taken together, suffice to establish the carcino-
genicity of benzo[a]pyrene in humans.
While the approach of this bookwould yield the same conclusion as IARC’s,
it should be noted that the procedures differ at certain points. IARC does
not formally endorse extrapolation from experimental animals. Note though
that this does not preclude altogether judgements about possible carcinogens
where no human research is available, as in cases where only animal studies
are available substances may be classified by IARC as belonging to Group
2B: The agent is possibly carcinogenic to humans. Nor does IARC formally
endorse robustness of evidence as grounds for upgrading a classification, but
allows for upgrading (or downgrading) a classification of carcinogenicity on
the basis of mechanistic evidence alone. On the approach of this book, one
may appeal to the aforementioned considerations, and one needs in addition to
establish correlation in humans (by direct observation or extrapolation), before
any claim about causality can be considered established.
Having considered an example,we nowcompare the general approach of this book
to external validity to that of IARC. IARC’s approach is summarized in Fig. 8.1.
The categories of IARC roughly correspond to those presented here, as follows.
IARC have a ranking for overall carcinogenicity:
Group 1 : Established
Group 2a : Provisionally established
Group 2b : Arguably true
Group 3 : Speculative
Group 4 : Ruled out
IARC also has a separate ranking of evidence of carcinogenicity in humans and
animals:
Sufficient : Established
Limited : Provisionally established
Inadequate : Arguable or speculative
Evidence Suggesting Lack
of Carcinogenicity (ESLC) : Ruled out
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Fig. 8.1 IARC’s approach to classifying potential carcinogens (http://monographs.iarc.fr/ENG/
Publications/Evaluations.pdf)
In addition, IARC has a separate ranking of evidence of mechanisms:
Strong : Established
Moderate : Provisionally established
Weak : Arguable or speculative
What is being assessed by these three categories is a general mechanistic claim: e.g.,
the existence of a mechanism of action in animals; or the similarity of mechanism
of action in humans to that in animals; or the existence of a mechanism of action in
humans.
The approach of this book is simpler than that of IARC in one respect: a single
scale from established to ruled out, rather than three different categorisations. On the
other hand, the scale adopted in this book involves more categories.
In order to compare the approach of this book with that of IARC, consider two
tables that illustrate the approach that this book takes with respect to external validity.
First, Table8.1 assumes that causality in the study has been established and charts
similarity of mechanisms in the study and target populations against causation in
the target population on the basis of evidence obtained on the target population.
A second table, Table8.2, assumes that similarity of mechanism is established and
charts causation in the study population against causation in the target population on
the basis of evidence obtained in the target population.
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Table 8.1 Determining the status of the causal claim from similarity of mechanisms in the study
and target populations and causation in the target population on the basis of evidence obtained on
the target population. It is assumed here that causality in the study population has been established
Similarity of mechanism in target and study
Established Provisionally
established




























Speculative Established Arguable Speculative Speculative Speculative
Ruled out Provisionally
ruled out
Ruled out Ruled out Ruled out Ruled out
Table 8.2 Determining the status of the causal claim from causation in the study population and
causation in the target population on the basis of evidence obtained on the target population. It is
assumed here that similarity of mechanism has been established
Causation in the study population
Established Provisionally
established




























Speculative Established Arguable Speculative Speculative Ruled out
Ruled out Provisionally
ruled out
Ruled out Ruled out Ruled out Ruled out
There is a broad agreement between the approach presented here and that of IARC.
As with the approach advocated here, IARC employs evidence of mechanisms to
draw conclusions about causation at two places: to evaluate efficacy in humans on
basis of evidence directly in humans and to ensure that causal claims in specific
animal populations can be extrapolated to humans. For the first task, IARC employs
theHill indicatorswithout assessingmechanistic studies in a systematicway. It is only
in assessing external validity that IARC explicitly evaluates studies that investigate
the details of the mechanism of action.
The approach presented here is more explicit with respect to where and what
evidence of mechanisms should be used. Firstly, this book recommends explic-
itly evaluating mechanistic studies when evaluating evidence obtained directly in
humans. After all, evaluating both whether there exists a mechanism and whether
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there exists a correlation is necessary for evaluating the evidence obtained directly in
humans (Sect. 7.1). The Hill indicators can only be seen as a first approximation to
the comprehensive assessment of mechanistic evidence needed to establish efficacy
in humans. What is more, these indicators tend to obfuscate, rather than clarify, dis-
tinctions between evidence pertinent to the correlational claim and evidence pertinent
to the general mechanistic hypothesis (Chap.6).
Secondly, this book separates the overall evaluation of causality and the evalua-
tion of evidence directly obtained in humans. The overall evaluation is obtained by
aggregating the evidence directly obtained in humans and the evidence in animals
(Sect. 7.2). For instance, it might be that, initially, some causal claim is established
in humans by considering studies that purely involve humans, but that, subsequently,
studies of a variety of animal species that are mechanistically similar to humans rule
out causation in those species. These further studies would surely cast enough doubt
on causation in humans so that the causal claim can no longer be considered estab-
lished. However, by identifying the overall evaluationwith the evaluation of evidence
directly obtained in humans when the evidence obtained on humans is sufficient (see
the top row of the IARC table, Fig. 8.1), IARC assigns Group 1 in this case (the
top right-hand corner of the IARC table). The procedure set out in this book would
assign status established to the causal claim on basis of just the evidence directly
obtained in humans, but it would assign overall status provisionally established on
the basis of all the evidence, animal as well as human (see the top-right corner of
Table8.2). This classification is perhaps more appropriate.
8.2 Comparison to SYRINA
SYRINA is a framework that was put forward to evaluate the strength of evidence
that a certain exposure is an endocrine disruptor (Vandenberg et al. 2016). This
approach first evaluates the evidence for an association between chemical exposure
and (adverse) effect. Second, this approach evaluates the evidence for an association
between the chemical and endocrine disrupting activity. Third, the evidence for an
association with an (adverse) effect and for an endocrine disrupting activity are
combined to obtain an overall assessment of endocrine disruption.
SYRINA combines quality of evidence ratings from different streams of evidence
in all three steps. As with our approach, the quality level of the causal claim is the
minimumof the quality of the different evidence streams. Figure8.2 gives the relevant
SYRINA table for an association between chemical exposure and (adverse) effect.
The resulting initial rating can be upgraded by one level if there is high confidence
in the evidence from in silico and in vitro studies.
In the next step, the endocrine disrupting activity of the exposure is evaluated
by combining different evidence streams. This time in vivo and in vitro evidence is
combined. Figure8.3 gives the relevant SYRINA table.
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Fig. 8.3 SYRINA table for
combining in vivo and in
vitro evidence
Finally, the quality levels for the association with adverse health outcomes and
for the endocrine activity are combined according to the table in Fig. 8.4.
In relatively unusual cases the resulting quality level can be upgraded or down-
graded by considerations given to the plausibility of the link of disrupting endocrine
disrupting activity and outcome.
Let us consider some points of comparison between SYRINA and the approach
of this book. First, this book formulates explicit methods for evaluating evidence of
mechanisms (Chap. 6). Second, for the evaluation of both endocrine activity and asso-
ciation with adverse health outcomes, SYRINA only combines two kinds of study.
When evaluating the plausibility of an association with adverse outcomes, SYRINA
combines results from experimental laboratory animals with evidence in humans or
wildlife animals. According to the approach presented in this book, application of
results from such associations in animals would need to be extrapolated with the
help of evidence of mechanisms along the lines of Sect. 7.2. In addition, mechanistic
considerations may be relevant when evaluating whether there is an association of
the chemical with adverse health outcomes. After all, an observed correlation may
be due to confounding. As with IARC, SYRINA makes use of the Hill indicators
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Fig. 8.4 SYRINA table for combining the quality levels for the association and the endocrine
activity
for evaluating each stream of evidence and does not explicitly distinguish between
evidence of mechanisms and evidence of correlation. Hence, while this book agrees
with SYRINA that many evidence streams should be considered when evaluating
causal claims, we would emphasise the need for a more systematic integration of
evidence of mechanisms and evidence of correlation along the lines of Chaps. 6
and 7.
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Chapter 9
Assessing Mechanisms in Public Health
Abstract Further considerations need to be borne in mind for evidence appraisal
in areas beyond clinical medicine, such as public health. This chapter looks at how
public health has treated associations and correlations. Then it examines the impor-
tance to public health of mechanisms operating at the group and individual level,
concerning social interactions and support, access to socio-sanitary infrastructures,
psychological factors, and so on, which have to be explored in the appraisal of
public health evidence. Finally, the chapter considers the relationship between bi-
ological and social factors, and the difference between mechanisms of disease and
mechanisms of prevention.
9.1 Introduction
When applying the ideas described in this book to areas other than therapeutic clini-
cal medicine, a number of further considerations need to be borne in mind. The arena
beyond clinical medicine where most thinking has been done relating to methods of
evidence appraisal is public health (NICE 2012). Public health is concerned with
actions, interventions and policies designed to protect the public from hazards, to
prevent disease, and to promote good health (Tannahill 1985). In different countries,
specific institutions were given the task of developing methods for the assessment
of evidence and for the formulation of guidelines in public health. These individual
efforts have been brought together into a European initiative, led by the European
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). In their 2011 synthesis report,
they show how public health should adopt and integrate the methods of evidence-
based medicine, specifically the GRADE system, for the assessment of evidence
(European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 2011). In this chapter the fo-
cus is on one particular sub-issue, namely mechanisms of causation and, given the
concerns of this book, how to deal with mechanisms conceptually and then practi-
cally in the appraisal of evidence.
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9.2 Public Health and Evidence-Based Medicine in the UK
Public health in the UK has been working within the evidence-based paradigm for-
mally since 2000, and much has been learned (Kelly et al. 2010; Kelly and Moore
2012). In 2001 the English Department of Health published its Research and Devel-
opment Strategy. Amongst other things it made the case for using the principles of
evidence based medicine in public health (Department of Health 2001). Organisa-
tions such as the Centre for Reviews and Dissemination at the University of York,
the Cochrane Collaboration, the Campbell Collaboration, the Health Development
Agency and NICE took up the challenge. These organisations have confronted in
various ways the methodological, theoretical, practical, epistemological and onto-
logical problems of applying EBM principles to the very broad church of public
health. Since then other policy areas have gone in the same direction of taking an
evidence based approach. So social care, education and criminal justice, amongst
others, have all had agencies created to move these arenas onto an evidence based
footing (Paisley et al. 2018).
9.3 Statistical Associations and Correlations in
Public Health
Statistical associations and correlations have been at the heart of progress in public
health for many years. A number of landmark studies show just how important
finding statistical associations can be. The investigations by Doll and Hill (1950,
1952, 1964) into the connections between smoking and disease are the original
benchmarks. Their initial observations showed that there was an association between
exposure to cigarette smoke and carcinoma of the lung (an association which had not
hitherto been noticed). This led, in the long run, to public health policies which have
reduced the prevalence of cigarette smoking in the population and greatly reduced the
number of deaths from lung cancer, and also heart disease, stroke, and various other
cancers, which were subsequently found to be associated with exposure to cigarette
smoke too.
These pioneering works are often thought to be purely statistical, but in fact Hill
was concerned with biological plausibility, and hence mechanisms (Hill 1965). S-
ince the early 1950s when the first statistical observations were made, the biological
mechanisms operating in the interaction between the contents of cigarette smoke
and the tissues in the lung, as well as the mechanisms relating to the effects on
blood circulation, heart functioning, arterial disease, and many other pathologies
have been described. Considerations about biological plausibility also led to inves-
tigations of the relation between asbestos and mesothelioma (Doll 1955; Newhouse
and Thompson 1965). Scientific discoveries relating to these mechanisms contin-
ues to the present. The basic mechanisms are well understood in individual human
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beings, and public health policy has developed in such a way that smoking in the
European Union is now a minority habit and protection from unwanted exposure to
cigarette smoke is the norm.
So cigarette smoking was identified as what public health practitioners have come
to call a risk factor. In the wake of this great public health success, statistical asso-
ciations have emerged over the years pointing to risks from other things, notably a
lack of physical activity, being overweight and obese, over consumption of alcohol
(Sytkowski et al. 1996), certain types of sexual activity (Dougan et al. 2005), in-
gesting certain non-prescribed drugs (White and Pitts 1998) as well as toxins in the
environment, although the dangerous consequences of exposure to certain substances
used in industrial processes like asbestos, phosphorus and radium had been known
long before the discoveries about smoking (Gochfeld 2005).
There is now a very large and important scientific literature originating in the ob-
servation of statistical correlations and subsequently strengthened into causal under-
standings based on the mechanisms at work in the human body following exposures.
Policies designed to protect the public have flowed from this scientific knowledge.
New risks regularly appear and currently the role of air pollution and toxins from
emissions from vehicles are under scrutiny. This debate mirrors events in the 1950s
when the dangers from smog in urban environments caused by the burning of coal
led to the Clean Air Act and the phasing out of coal as a primary domestic fuel in
the UK (Brimblecombe 2006). In public health there is a long history of bringing
together correlations and mechanisms to understand the processes which can cause
a number of very common diseases and which potentially offer a platform to take
action to mitigate the risks and harms, and, as with the Clean Air Acts of the 1950s
and action against tobacco, have been highly effective and successful.
9.4 Recurrent Public Health Problems
—Non-communicable Disease in the Present
However, notwithstanding the successeswith smoking and clean air, deaths from pre-
ventable causes which are known and well understood have not gone away. Deaths
from non-communicable diseases associated with excess calorie and alcohol con-
sumption and lack of physical activity continue to increase steadily in most countries
around the world (Beaglehole et al. 2012). Type 2 diabetes, cardiovascular disease,
and certain cancers all have rising prevalence even though the statistical associations
between the diseases and the risk factors are well known and the mechanisms oper-
ating at the individual level are well understood (though in some diseases better than
others).
This is very important as far as appraising evidence ofmechanisms is concerned. It
is fundamentally important in ethical terms too, because the rising prevalence, while
affecting the whole of the population, affects those in poorer andmore disadvantaged
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circumstances to a far greater extent than the well to do and the privileged (Wilkin-
son and Marmot 2003). There is a sharp gradient in health inequities that shows
a strong correlation between poor health and early death from non-communicable
disease and disadvantage. This holds whether disadvantage is measured by income,
occupation (or lack of it), housing tenure or educational level or qualifications (Buck
and Frosini 2012). The fact is that there are a number of mechanisms which are
conceptually and practically distinct from the mechanisms describing the processes
of disease causation following exposure to a pathogen or toxin of some kind. Such
mechanisms operate at the group and individual level, and concern social interactions
and support, access to socio-sanitary infrastructures, psychological factors, etc. It is
these mechanisms as well as the biological ones, which have to be explored in the
appraisal of public health evidence (Kelly et al. 2014).
9.5 The Individual Level and the Population Level
The first thing to note is that mechanisms operate at different levels. In almost all
of the investigations referred to above, the mechanisms that have been subject to
most scrutiny are those operating at the level of individual human biology. So, after
association were found in the population data, the focus shifted to understanding
what was actually going on in the human body when it was exposed to cigarette
smoke, ethanol, high levels of sugar, asbestos, particulates in the atmosphere and so
on. And this approach of course has shown why these exposures are harmful and
how they operate on the human biology. These investigations have been extremely
successful and we now have plausible biological mechanistic explanations.
But what about the mechanisms operating at the population level?What about the
mechanisms that produce the patterning of health between the rich and the poor, be-
tween different parts of countries (Graham and Kelly 2004)? In the United Kingdom,
for instance, health on average is much worse in Scotland and the North of England
than in the South. How can we explain that?What are the mechanisms which explain
the fact that, on average, baby boys born in Guildford will livemuch longer than baby
boys born in Shettleston in Glasgow? What are the mechanisms which link poverty
to early death? And what are the relationships between the mechanisms going on
biologically and in the wider social and physical environment (Kelly et al. 2014)?
With the stunning progress in understanding the biochemistry of disease since the
nineteenth century, the tendency has been to focus on mechanisms operating at the
biological individual level. As noted above this is usually relatively straightforward,
as the biological processes have been well understood in broad terms for decades
and the detail is constantly developing as the science progresses. But what are the
social and behavioural mechanisms involved? The behavioral mechanisms are also
reasonably well described in the psychological literature (see Table9.1 for some
examples). Models and theories explaining why, on average, humans are likely to do
this or that, are plentiful (Conner and Norman 2005). However, why when following
9.5 The Individual Level and the Population Level 115
Table 9.1 Behavioural mechanisms
Hazard Behavioural mechanisms Disease/morbidity




Exposure to ethanol, binge
drinking
Socializing Liver disease, certain cancers
Exposure to HPV Unprotected sex, socializing Cervical cancer
Exposure to mosquitos Sanitation, clothing Zika
Workplace posture Incorrect posture while sitting
or working with a computer,
poor lifting practices
Lower back pain
Work overload Organizational structures,
management practices
Anxiety, depression
the same intervention based on the same information about the dangers of smoking,
one individual does “this” (say, decides and successfully quits smoking) and one
does “that” (doesn’t even think about quitting smoking) is less well understood in a
mechanistic sense (Marteau et al. 2015).
However, where the biggest gaps in mechanistic understandings exist, is at the
social or population level. The associations between poverty and poor health have
been known since at least the middle of the nineteenth century and for probably
much longer than that in a non-statistical sense. But how it works mechanistically is
much less well defined. From an evidence appraiser’s point of view there is no easy
solution to these problems and neither will there be till primary studies examining
the mechanisms have been conducted. But it is important nevertheless to ask the
questions. And to ask the questions in a way that acknowledges that we do indeed
knowwith a very high degree of certainty that there is a relationship between wealth,
education and employment and health, but we do not know with sufficient clarity
what the mechanisms are and in such a way as to target interventions and policies in
a directed way to be maximally effective (Kriznik et al. 2018).
There have been many attempts around the world to tackle inequalities in health
and while overall the health of populations has improved decade on decade, the rel-
ative inequities remain a stubborn fact of life (WHO 2008). Although the lack of
political will to do something about it has been a major barrier everywhere, one of
the other important reasons for failure has been an absence of mechanistic studies at
the population level studies and therefore of the ability to know what to do based on
mechanistic understandings of the causal pathways involved.
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9.6 The Biological Level and the Social Level
In recent years, the relationship between the individual biological level and the so-
cial level has come under scrutiny as a consequence of developments in biology
itself, particularly developments in developmental programming, epigenetics and
metabolomics. While each of these topics is different, what they have in common is
that they show how the human phenotype is the product as much of its environment
physically and socially as it is of its genetic inheritance (Kelly and Kelly 2018).
Human (and animal) biology is much more plastic in the face of environmental ex-
posures than had been previously thought. DNA doesn’t change, but the way that
it is expressed does. The metabolic structure of our bodies reveals a timeline of the
various exposures we have been subjected to across the life course. Factors affecting
the health of our grandmother when she was pregnant with our ownmother may have
a fundamental effect on our own health in adulthood. The mechanisms here are now
quite well developed (Hanson and Gluckman 2011; Ozanne and Constância 2007)
and they show that our health is not just a metabolic response to toxins; it is about a
complex social and biological interaction—a relational process ormechanism. These
mechanisms are critically mediated by the social worlds that people inhabit.
This science is still developing at a rapid rate and along with it, the understanding
of the human genome and the therefore of individual biological differences between
humans. It is highly likely that new and better mechanistic models and understand-
ings will emerge including ones incorporating the social factors. The implications
for the evidence appraiser at this stage are that the question should be asked—are
mechanisms relating to the relationship between biological and social factors being
described, used, and articulated? A further important epistemological consideration
is the degree to which the approach taken by the researcher is a genuinely a relational
one—in other words, one that sees the process as a dynamic and interactive one rather
than a deterministic one. This is important because if the new understandings of the
plasticity of biology are to be useful in public health, the models need to move away
from a reductionist approach and should instead be about elucidating the interactive
nature of the process. Again this is a question to be asked by the evidence appraiser:
what is the nature of the interaction?
9.7 Mechanisms of Disease and Mechanisms of Prevention
There is another question to be asked about the evidence of mechanisms in public
health matters and that is about the difference between the causes of disease and
the causes of prevention (Kelly and Russo 2018). So far in this chapter we have
focused on the important difference between the causes of disease in individuals and
the mechanisms involved and the causes of the patterning of disease at population
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Table 9.2 Public health mechanisms for tackling obesity
Generic, population level Targeted
Food advertising, e.g., max amount per day,
recommended amount per day, amount of lipids
or carbohydrates contained in food portions
MEND programmes in the UK http://www.
mendfoundation.org/, e.g., targeted training for
school children about diet and healthy
lifestyles, targeted training for parents about
psychological risks related to obesity
level and the mechanisms involved in this patterning. We have also discussed the
mechanisms involved in the relationships between the two.
But there is another very important distinction to draw out which is especially
important in public health. This is the difference between mechanisms causing the
disease (either in individuals or in populations) and the mechanisms involved in
preventing disease (e.g., Table9.2). The question simply is this. Does knowing the
cause of a disease (an exposure to something which is risky) and knowing that by
reducing exposure that disease will be prevented, tell you how to reduce exposure?
The short answer is that it doesn’t, though many public health policies proceed
as if it did. The biology of the aetiology of lung cancer, of liver disease, of type
two diabetes and the metabolic syndrome tell you nothing about the mechanisms
involved in helping people to stop smoking, to consume less alcohol, to eat fewer
calories or take more exercise. Knowledge of the cause tells us what people should
do, but it doesn’t explain how to do it. The mechanisms involved in smoking and
giving up smoking, the mechanisms involved in the practices of eating and drinking
(and for that matter, sexual conduct, bad driving, or going jogging) belong to a
quite different realm of evidence than microbiology. The relevant evidence is social
and psychological. The mechanisms involved are social and psychological and there
is a considerable amount of evidence, some of which has been around for a long
time, describing both associations and mechanisms—see Becker et al. (1977) and
Kelly and Russo (2018). For the most part, however, public health policy (with the
very significant and successful exception of smoking) pays scant attention to the
social and psychological evidence, mechanistic or otherwise. We suggest that the
evidence appraiser begins by asking the question: what evidence is available about
the aetiology of the disease?Andwhat evidence about effective preventivemeasures?
The distinction between aetiology and prevention should then guide the appraisal of
correlations and ofmechanisms. Specifically, are onlymechanisms at biological level
invoked, or also social mechanisms?
Finally, for bothmechanismof disease andmechanismof prevention, the evidence
sources will be heterogeneous. The disciplines of psychology, sociology, economic-
s, anthropology, organisational behaviour, political science, history, and the public
health sciences all have, and have had, things to say on these matters. Unfortunately,
it is not the case that we can simply cheerfully agree that the evidence for these things
is heterogeneous so we should just pull it all together, synthesise it and out will come
a nice clear set of mechanisms. The reason for this is that each of these disciplines,
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and the many sub-disciplines within each of them, operate with a variety of episte-
mological, methodological and ontological assumptions about the nature of human
life and its place in the world. Sometimes these veer toward highly individualistic
accounts sometimes to more socially oriented accounts. So the task is not to try to
adjudicate, but to acknowledge the differences, to articulate them (even if the re-
searchers don’t themselves do that), and to consider the degree to which the different
positions reallymatter in terms of the substantive problem (Kelly 2017). Intriguingly,
all these disciplines are dealingwith the same basic concern—humans in the physical
and social world and what is going on in their heads as they go about their business.
They each construct ways of seeing and describing the same phenomena differently
and in ways that sometimes defy any kind of commensurability. However as long
as the appraiser keeps in mind that the basic thing under consideration is the same,
and there are just lots of different ways of looking at the phenomena, then the task
is not an impossible one. But as ever the first step is to ask the appropriate question,
to describe what is there in terms of evidence and to determine to what extent this
allows us to understand the mechanisms with clarity.
Here are some simple questions that one can ask in order to structure the search
for relevant mechanistic studies, in the context of public health interventions:
Checklist of questions:
1. What disease is the intervention targeting? Infectious or non-
communicable?
2. What biological mechanisms are known?
3. What socio-economic or psychological mechanisms are known scientifical-
ly?
4. How can behavioural mechanisms reduce exposure?
5. Why might public health interventions targeting the pathogens fail?
6. What is the public perception of the disease in terms of risk, seriousness
and personal vulnerability?
7. What mechanisms come into play as a population or different segments in
the population react to an intervention?
8. Are there sub-groups within the population that should be specifically tar-
geted? How can they be reached and what specific mechanisms might come
into play?
Users interested in carrying out structured searches for relevant mechanistic stud-
ies should refer to the Public Health and Social Care tool in Sect. 4.7.
References 119
References
Beaglehole, R., Bonita, R., Horton, R., Ezzati, M., Bhala, N., Amuyunzu-Nyamongo, M., et al.
(2012). Measuring progress on NCDs: One goal and five targets. The Lancet, 380(9850), 1283–
1285.
Becker, M. H., Haefner, D. P., Kasl, S. V., Kirscht, J. P., Maiman, L. A., & Rosenstock, I. M. (1977).
Selected psychosocialmodels and correlates of individual health-related behaviors.MedicalCare,
15(5), 27–46.
Brimblecombe, P. (2006). The clean air act after 50 years. Weather, 61(11), 311–314.
Buck, D., & Frosini, F. (2012). Clustering of unhealthy behaviours over time (pp. 1–24). London:
The Kings Fund.
Conner, M., & Norman, P. (2005). Predicting health behaviour. UK: McGraw-Hill Education.
Department of Health (2001). A research and development strategy for public health. UK National
Archives. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121206164331/, http://www.dh.gov.uk/
prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/digitalasset/dh_4020946.pdf.
Doll, R.,&Hill, A. B. (1950). Smoking and carcinoma of the lung.BritishMedical Journal, 2(4682),
739.
Doll, R. (1955). Mortality from lung cancer in asbestos workers. British Journal of Industrial
Medicine, 12, 81–86.
Doll, R., & Hill, A. B. (1952). Study of the aetiology of carcinoma of the lung. British Medical
Journal, 2(4797), 1271.
Doll, R., & Hill, A. B. (1964). Mortality in relation to smoking: Ten years’ observations of British
doctors. British Medical Journal, 1(5395), 1399.
Dougan, S., Gilbart, V. L., Sinka, K., & Evans, B. G. (2005). HIV infections acquired through
heterosexual intercourse in the United Kingdom: Findings from national surveillance. British
Medical Journal, 330(7503), 1303–1304.
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. (2011). How to assess the best available
evidence when time is limited and there is lack of sound evidence. European Centre for Disease
Prevention and Control, Stockholm: Technical report.
Gochfeld, M. (2005). Chronologic history of occupational medicine. Journal of Occupational and
Environmental Medicine, 47(2), 96–114.
Graham, H., & Kelly, M. P. (2004). Health inequalities: Concepts, frameworks and policy.
NHS Health Development Agency. Briefing Paper, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/
242494475_Health_Inequalities_Concepts_Frameworks_and_Policy.
Hanson, M., & Gluckman, P. (2011). Developmental origins of noncommunicable disease: Popu-
lation and public health implications. The American Journal of Clinical Nutrition, 94(6 Suppl),
1754S–1758S.
Hill, A. B. (1965). The environment and disease: Association or causation? Proceedings of the
Royal Society of Medicine, 58, 295–300.
Kelly, M. (2017). On epistemological and ontological incommensurability in modelling behaviour
change. In S. Christmas, S. Michie, & R. West (Eds.), Thinking about behaviour change: An
interdisciplinary dialogue. London: Silverback.
Kelly, M., & Kelly, R. (2018). Quantifying social influences throughout the life course: Action,
structure and ‘omics’. In M. Meloni, J. Cromby, P. Fitzgerald, & S. Lloyd (Eds.), Handbook of
Biology and Society (pp. 587–609). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kelly, M. P., Kelly, R. S., & Russo, F. (2014). The integration of social, behavioral, and biological
mechanisms in models of pathogenesis. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, 57(3), 308–328.
Kelly, M. P., &Moore, T. A. (2012). The judgement process in evidence-based medicine and health
technology assessment. Social Theory and Health, 10(1), 1–19.
Kelly,M.,Morgan, A., Ellis, S., Younger, T., Huntley, J., & Swann, C. (2010). Evidence based public
health: A reviewof the experience of the national institute of health and clinical excellence (NICE)
of developing public health guidance in England. Social Science andMedicine, 71(6), 1056–1062.
120 9 Assessing Mechanisms in Public Health
Kelly, M., & Russo, F. (2018). Causal narratives in public health: The difference between mecha-
nisms of aetiology and mechanisms of prevention in non-communicable diseases. Sociology of
Health and Illness, 40(1), 82–99.
Kriznik, N., Kinmonth, A., Ling, T., & Kelly, M. (2018). Moving beyond individual choice in
policies to reduce health inequalities: The integration of dynamic with individual explanations.
Journal of Public Health. Under consideration.
Marteau, T.M., Hollands, G. J., &Kelly,M. P. (2015). Changing population behaviour and reducing
health disparities: Exploring the potential of choice architecture interventions. Technical Report
15-0002, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. AHRQ publication.
Newhouse, M. L., & Thompson, H. (1965). Mesothelioma of pleura and peritoneum following
exposure to asbestos in the London area. Occupational and Environmental Medicine, 22(4),
261–269.
NICE (2012). The NICE public health guidance development process. https://www.nice.org.uk/
process/pmg5/chapter/introduction.
Ozanne, S. E., & Constância, M. (2007). Mechanisms of disease: The developmental origins of
disease and the role of the epigenotype. Nature Reviews Endocrinology, 3(7), 539.
Paisley, S., Aananiadou, S., Levay, P., & Kelly, M. (2018). Public health, policy and the evidence-
based medicine paradigm: Challenges and innovations in methods of searching. Under consider-
ation.
Sytkowski, P. A., D’Agostino, R. B., Belanger, A., & Kannel, W. B. (1996). Sex and time trends
in cardiovascular disease incidence and mortality: The Framingham heart study, 1950–1989.
American Journal of Epidemiology, 143(4), 338–350.
Tannahill, A. (1985). What is health promotion? Health Education Journal, 44(4), 167–168.
White, D., & Pitts,M. (1998). Educating young people about drugs: A systematic review.Addiction,
93(10), 1475–1487.
WHO (2008). Closing the gap in a generation: Health equity through action on the social de-
terminants of health: Commission on social determinants of health final report. World Health
Organization.
Wilkinson, R. G., & Marmot, M. (2003). Social determinants of health: The solid facts. World
Health Organization.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
Chapter 10
Particularisation to an Individual
Abstract In Sect. 7.1, we discussed extrapolation from a study population to a target
population. In this chapter, we treat particularisation from a study population to one
of its members. In both cases, evidence of similarity of mechanisms plays a crucial
role.
Inference from an effectiveness claim involving a whole population to effectiveness
in one of its members is of central importance in medical diagnosis, prognosis, and
treatment. This mode of inference is often called direct inference (Kyburg et al. 2001;
Wallmann 2017; Wallmann and Williamson 2017).
The case we discuss here is very simple. Evidence of effectiveness in only one
population to which the individual belongs is available. The case in which such
evidence for several such populations is available is much more complicated and
we will not deal with it here. If one has established effectiveness in a population,
then one has also established that there is a mechanism operating that connects the
putative cause and effect. Now, the population may not be entirely homogeneous
with respect to this mechanism: some individuals will exemplify the mechanism
while others may not. One way to establish that mechanisms in the population are
applicable to a particular individual is by assessing how homogeneous the population
iswith respect to themechanismof action. Inference from a homogeneous population
to individuals is more likely to succeed, because most individuals will exhibit the
mechanism responsible for causation in the population.
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However, in most cases there will be subpopulations for which effectiveness does
not hold. Theremay be several reasons for this kind of exceptionality. Firstly, in some
such subpopulations the mechanism responsible for effectiveness in the whole popu-
lation simply does not operate. For instance, while drinking considerable amounts of
milk is normally safe, subpopulations with lactase deficiency should drink only small
amounts of milk. Considering whether crucial features of the mechanism responsi-
ble for effectiveness are present in the particular individual can therefore increase
certainty about whether the causal claim is applicable to the individual. Secondly,
counteracting mechanisms may operate in some subpopulations. For instance, exer-
cising is normally beneficial for preventing stroke by lowering blood cholesterol,
but smoking may counteract these beneficial effects by raising blood cholesterol.
With this in mind, the following questions can assist the evaluation of evidence of
mechanisms for direct inference:
Particularisation to an individual
What is the status of the claim that the mechanism of action in the population
is responsible for effectiveness in the individual? Consider the following
questions; can both be answered in the affirmative?
Exemplification. Are the crucial features of the mechanism of action in the
population preserved in the individual?
Masking. Are there further mechanisms operating in the individual that coun-
teract the mechanism operating in the population?
When ruling out masking, one needs to pay attention to co-morbidities, social
mechanisms, genetic susceptibility and many more. For instance, when assess-
ing whether a certain patient with breast cancer will benefit from a treatment by
trastuzumab, one needs to test for HER2. HER2 if overexpressed, increases cell
growth over its normal limits. Trastuzumab blocks the effects of overexpression of
HER2. If the patient does not overexpress HER2, the drug will not work for her
(Bange et al. 2001). Note that if exemplification has been established and masking
ruled out, it is possible to particularise a population-level causal claim to an indi-
vidual without the need for the population to be homogeneous with respect to the
mechanism of action. On the other hand, a high degree of homogeneity provides
prima facie evidence for exemplification and against masking, and thereby supports
particularisation.
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Example. Lactose intolerance
Theworld population is not very homogeneouswith the reaction tomilk intake.
About 65% of people are lactose intolerant at some point in their lives. How-
ever, in different populations there are differing frequencies of lactose intol-
erant members. Only 5% of Northern Europeans and more than 90% in some
populations in East Asia are lactose intolerant, for instance (NIH 2017). This
is because in East Asia lactase deficiency is quite common, while it is quite
unusual in Northern Europe. Now, establishing that the patient has no lac-
tase deficiency may be sufficient to establish that she may safely drink milk
at high doses. However, even if ruling out lactase deficiency is not possible,
establishing homogeneity in a relevant subpopulationmay provide grounds for
provisionally establishing causality in its members. If, for instance, a patient
is North European, this may make it quite plausible that she can drink milk
safely. If, on the other hand, a patient is East Asian, this may make it quite
plausible that she cannot drink milk safely.
Example. The Shonubi case
Nigerian drug-mule Shonubi was caught on his eighth trip from Nigeria on
the JFK airport carrying heroin in his digestive tract (Colyvan et al. 2001). For
sentencing purposes, it was assessed whether the total amount of drugs smug-
gled on his seven prior trips was greater than a specific amount M . There was
statistical data available for the amount of drugs carried by balloon-swallowing
heroin smugglers from Nigeria. Moreover, there is a social mechanism involv-
ing these smugglers that helps to explain the amount of drugs they smuggle:
the local drug organisation trains the mules in balloon-swallowing for several
weeks and threatens people who refuse with violence (Izenman 2000).
It seems best to estimate the amount of drugs smuggled by Shonubi on
his seven prior trips by the average amount smuggled by balloon-swallowing
heroin smugglers fromNigeria. There is high quality mechanistic evidence for
application to Shonubi available. Firstly, themechanism that connects balloon-
swallowing heroin smugglers from Nigeria to the quantity of drugs smuggled
does apply to Shonubi. The local organisation did indeed train Shonubi by
similar methods to those applied to other drug mules, for instance. Secondly,
it seems that, for all we know, there is no counteracting mechanism that makes
Shonubi an exceptional drug mule. Note that the trip on which he was caught
was already his eighth. Thirdly, although there is some variability with respect
to the amount smuggled within balloon-swallowing heroin smugglers from
Nigeria, virtually all drug mules smuggled more than M grams. Hence, the
balloon-swallowing heroin smugglers from Nigeria is arguably a sufficiently
homogeneous population.
124 10 Particularisation to an Individual
Table 10.1 Determining the status of the causal claim in the individual given the status of the
causal claim in the population and the status of the claim that the mechanism of action in individual
and population is similar

























Arguable Speculative Speculative Speculative
Arguable Arguable Speculative Speculative Speculative Speculative
Speculative Speculative Speculative Speculative Speculative Speculative
Toobtain the status of effectiveness for a particular individual, one can combine the
status of the effectiveness claim in the population with the status of the mechanistic
similarity claim (i.e., the claim that there is exemplification and no masking), as in
Table10.1.
A few remarks shed some light on this table.
First, observe that effectiveness in an individual can almost never be ruled out
by the fact that the mechanism responsible for effectiveness in the population is
not present in the individual. After all, the individual may exemplify an alternative
mechanism of action. I.e., the individual may be a member of a different population,
which also exhibits effectiveness but with a different mechanism of action, and this
alternative mechanism is present in the individual.
Second, particularisation is a special case of extrapolation. When particularised,
a causal claim is extrapolated to the subpopulation of population-members that share
all the relevant properties of the individual. This target subpopulation will typically
be small, but it remains a subpopulation. Suppose, for instance, we are interested
in whether a 30 year old Norwegian farmer will develop an adverse reaction when
drinking milk. 95% of individuals in Northern Europe show no such reaction. Here,
the target population relevant to particularisation may contain only the farmer in
question, while the study population is the class of all Northern Europeans.
Third, there are nevertheless some differences between the evaluation of external
validity and the evaluation of particularisation to an individual. Particularisation to
the individual is more likely to succeed than is extrapolation from a study population
to a target population that is not a subpopulation of the study population. This is
because causality established in a population is more informative about individu-
als in this population than about individuals in different populations. For instance,
if the population is very homogeneous, then particularisation to the individual is
likely to succeed while extrapolation to other populations may well fail. This fact
is reflected in the above tables. Consider the case where no studies are available
which involve the particular individual. If mechanistic similarity is provisionally
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established and effectiveness is established in the population, the causal claim is
provisionally established for the individual, according to the particularisation table.
In the case of external validity, if mechanistic similarity between the study and target
populations is provisionally established and effectiveness is established in the study
population, effectiveness in the target population is only arguable (see Sect. 7.2). It
is worth emphasizing here though that particularisation to an individual is still an
extrapolation, and should still be considered fallible.
Note finally that, in contrast to the method of evaluating external validity in
Sect. 7.2, in the present chapter we treat the case where there is no evidence for
causation obtained by studies directly on the target population.
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